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ABSTRACT
A Study of Semantic and Syntactic
Control of Fixations in Reading
May, 1981
Patrick J. Carroll, B.A., M.A., College of William and Mary
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor James I. Chumbley
Semantic priming, the influence of the processing of one concept
on the later processing of another concept, has been a focus of
intense research and speculation in the study of language
comprehension and of the organization of knowledge. Researchers,
however, have been hindered by methodological problems in testing
theories in natural reading situations. Recent developments in eye
tracking technology have made it possible to observe momentary
variations in reading difficulty in a relatively unobtrusive way,
thus allowing precise measurement of priming effects in reading.
This thesis proposes that fixation durations in reading reflect
several levels of language processing. Interlexical associations,
once activated, can alter initial identification of a word. In
addition, the act of integrating a concept into the general
representation of the sentence or the text can influence processing
time and, consequently, alter immediate fixation time on a word. The
vli
availability of information to influence processing other information
is severely limited by the capacity of working memory. The language
comprehension system is guided or controlled, at least in part, by
syntactic structure in determining which information to keep in
working memory.
Four experiments are presented in support of this view.
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate independent effects of automatic
interlexical priming and sentence integration processes. Experiments
3 and 4 show that clausal boundaries can reduce associative priming
under certain circumstances. In addition. Experiment M suggests that
retrieval of information in memory, frequently thought to be the
source of context effects, may not be a source of priming.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The goal of this dissertation is to examine some current ideas
about the impact of context on reading behavior, to relate the
reader's use of context to other factors influencing comprehension,
and to explore some of the relationships between the general problems
of language processing and the specific activity of reading. The
behavior that is analyzed here is that of the eyes of readers who are
attending to the meaning of normal English sentences. The
information processing viewpoint, which guides this research,
suggests that the reader's purposive activity of attending to the
meaning of the text is supported by a system of knowledge, of
mechanisms and processes which make reading possible. Within this
framework, a useful analysis of reading entails identifying both the
component processes controlling behavior and the information to which
the components respond.
The jump from eye to mind is not as great as it seems at first
glance. A number of facts about the nature of the visual processing
system, particularly the way it operates during reading, combine to
justify the use of measures of ocular behavior for drawing inferences
about visual language processing. The central fact is that the
behavior of the eyes during reading is strikingly plodding and
sequential. A typical record of a reader's eyes shows that nearly
every word is fixated and that these fixations occur in the same
1
2order that the words would have been heard had the sentence been
spoken.
The short, sequential steps taken by the eyes can be interpreted
given a second fact: the window of clear vision in reading, the
perceptual span, is very limited in its extent. Best estimates are
that a reader can see clearly enough to accurately identify words
within a range extending approximately i| character spaces to the left
of the center of fixation and 7 or 8 characters to the right of
fixation for readers of English (McConkie & Rayner, 1975, 1976;
O'Regan, 1981; Rayner, 1975; Rayner & Bertera, 1979). Studies of the
perceptual span have increasingly led theorists to the position that
reading is a word by word activity, the word at the center of
fixation being about all that is encoded at a given time (Just &
Carpenter, 1980; McConkie, Blanchard, Zola, & Wolverton, 1982;
McConkie, Zola, Blanchard, & Wolverton, 1982; Rayner, 1975; Rayner &
Pollatsek, 1981; Zola & McConkie, 1982).
It is somewhat inaccurate to describe the perceptual span as a
single, relatively undifferentiated area. McConkie and Rayner (1976;
Rayner & McConkie, 1977) distinguish two functionally distinct
perceptual spans. The inner perceptual span, which is discussed
above, is the one involved in word identification. An outer
perceptual span accumulates the information which guides saccadic eye
movements. This information can come from an area 7 or 8 character
spaces beyond the limits of the inner perceptual span (at least to
the right of the center of fixation). The saccadic guidance
3on
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information is abstract and general, consisting of the approximate
lengths of the next few upcoming words and the shapes or perhaps the
identities of the first two or three letters of the word immediately
subsequent to the one currently in the center of fixation.
Word identification and saccadic guidance not only rely
different visual information, they are apparently dependent
functionally distinct systems. Rayner and McConkie (1976) found
little correlation between saccade length and fixation duration in
normal reading. Some correlation between distance of movement and
fixation duration might be expected if both measures were responding
to the same aspects of the text. In addition, Rayner and Pollatsek
(1981) demonstrated that manipulating the amount of parafoveal
Information available to the reader alters saccade length, but not
fixation duration, while delaying the onset of the text at the
beginning of a fixation increases the fixation duration without
affecting saccade length. Thus, fixation duration and fixation
location can be seen as independent measures of language processing.
The measurement of language processing in the experiments
reported in this dissertation will be based on fixation duration.
Fixation times vary considerably both within the record of a single
individual and across different readers. This variability does not
appear to be random. Several sources of evidence indicate that
fixation durations respond to local factor affecting processing ease
or difficulty. Tinker (1958) showed that average fixation time
increases with increasing difficulty of the text. Some experimenters
4(Morton. 1964a; Kolers. 1976) have held that fixation time reflects
relatively local processing demands, but have proposed that there is
frequently a delay between the eyes' initial encounter with
information of a particular difficulty and the reflection of this
difficulty in the activity of the eye (cf.. Rayner. 1978. for a
discussion of the "cognitive-lag hypothesis"). Recent work, however,
supports the hypothesis that there is an immediate response of the
eyes to processing demands of the text. Rayner (1977) and Just and
Carpenter (1980) report that less frequent words receive longer
fixation times than common words of the same length. Grammatical
function also seems to influence the amount of time a word will be
fixated (Rayner. 1977; Just & Carpenter. 1980). The decision to make
a regression also seems to occur as soon as confusion is able to be
detected, without noticeable lag which would indicate a dislocation
of comprehension from the eye position (Frazier & Rayner, 1982;
Carpenter & Daneman. 1981; Just & Carpenter. 1978).
In summary, the visual language processing system can be roughly
characterized as a small (approximately 12 character spaces, shifted
to the right of center) window of relatively clear vision moving in
short, slightly overlapping steps across the text. The difficulty of
processing the information within the window affects the length of
time the window remains in that position. Beyond this clear window
(extending perhaps another 7 or 8 character spaces) is a less clear
window which permits some general characteristics of the text to be
identified. The information coming from this outer area guides the
5majority of saccadic movements which propel the window to its next
resting point.
In this dissertation, fixation time will be used as a sort of
decision time. Presumably, the "decision" is whether or not the word
has been processed to such an extent that further viewing of the
visual features would be of little value to the reader. In the
studies reported in this paper, all of the stimuli are isolated
sentences and the subjects' task is to read these sentences and to
comprehend them. For the processing system, it will be assumed that
this goal of comprehension implies that a coherent representation of
the sentence, consistent with the rules of grammar and knowledge of
the world, must be produced. Except in the final experiment, the
discourse context for any given word is contained within a single
sentence. Thus, certain demands of establishing discourse coherence
are minimized, while contextual information which might normally help
in interpretation of the sentences is not available. Nevertheless,
within these limits, the task of the subjects in these experiments is
an everyday activity: reading.
The experiments reported in this paper study the problem of how
information contained within a sentence affects processing of other
information within the same sentence. In particular, do well-learned
lexical associations influence processing in cases where such
associations are not necessary for comprehension of the sentences,
but rather are contained incidentally within the sentences? A
further problem is to identify the components or stages of processing
6where such influences are located.
This thesis will argue that word processing time during normal
reading is affected both by interlexical influences on encoding and
by difficulty of integrating new information into the representation
of the sentence. These influences appear quickly, while each word is
being fixated. It will also be argued that readers are sensitive to
a various kinds of information (semantic, pragmatic, syntactic), but
that this sensitivity can be altered by task demands or different
goals of the reader. In this chapter, research on contextual
influences on reading is reviewed. Related research on semantic
priming and on sentence processing is also discussed.
Semantic Context in Reading
Within the domain of semantic context, several different levels
can be identified, each potentially having its own peculiar
processing characteristics. The usual sense of semantic context
refers to a rather global level, often described as a theme or topic
of the paragraph or passage. This type of context is built up over
several sentences and its effects should persist until the topic is
changed or the discourse is terminated (Foss, 1982). A second level
of context is that confined within the sentence boundaries.
Sentential context should reflect not only some relatively specific
lexical relations, but grammatical relations as well. Finally, the
most restricted level of context is that contained within a phrase,
frequently within a word pair. Even in a very restricted unit.
7processing context could affect processing, as. for example, in the
case of a noun phrase in which a modifier strongly suggests a
succeeding noun (e.g., "amusement park" or "Goodyear blimp").
Contextual information arises from the processing of prior parts
of the text, either directly, from explicit mention of some concept
or event, or indirectly, as in the case of an inference or
elaboration. This information is potentially available to the
language processor, but the important processing question concerns
when and how it is used. To properly assess the impact of context on
normal reading, it is important to distinguish what a reader could do
given unlimited processing at each fixation from what a reader
actually does in the course of normal reading. Tightly constrained
contexts can easily be constructed, allowing an experimenter to
produce a high level of agreement among judges about the identity of
an upcoming word (e.g., "It was so cold that his fingers felt like
..."). Similarly, almost any thematically and grammatically coherent
context eliminates many words and phrases which are not possible
continuations or completions of a sentence fragment. Nevertheless,
predictability may affect judgments in a rating task or a Cloze
procedure while being irrelevant to fluent reading. Consider two
reasons why this might be true. First, the perceptual intake of
information could out race top-down processes. Efficient reading may
be so fast that, even if there are parts of the system generating
predictions, these expectancies would have insufficient time to
develop and produce an impact on the behavior of the reader. A
8second reason involves the role of attention in reading. A context
may be capable of providing hints to the reader only when attention
is devoted to using the context to solve some problem or to elaborate
some idea. There are few demands on the judge in a rating task or a
Cloze task, so attention can be devoted to producing contextual
connections. The reader, however, must deal with a variety of
processing demands, each of these reducing the availability of the
limited attentional resources and, consequently, curtailing the
reader's ability to access potentially useful contextual information
Experimental demonstrations of the fact that a sentential
context can facilitate the processing of a congruent word and
interfere with the processing of an inconsistent word have been
available for nearly two decades (Morton, 196^1; Tulving & Gold, 1963;
Tulving, Handler, and Baumal, 196i|). The measure of contextual
influences on processing in these studies was visual duration
threshold, the minimum time to correctly identify a
tachistoscopically presented word. Since that time, there have been
a number of studies from several laboratories investigating the same
problem using other techniques. In the most common paradigm, a
sentence lacking its final word, the sentence frame, is presented
visually. After the subject has had sufficient time to read the
sentence frame, the final word is displayed. The processing
difficulty of that target is measured using either rapid
pronunciation or a lexical decision task requiring a word-nonword
judgment.
9The primary goal of the sentence frame experiments has been to
distinguish facilitation by a predictive context from inhibition by a
misleading context. In the earliest study. Schuberth and Eimas
(1977) found a significant difference in lexical decision time
between semantically congruous and incongruous sentence completions,
supporting the earlier studies which showed facilitation of word
processing by a sentence context. Fischler and Bloom (I979, 198O)
make the further distinction between semantic congruity and
predictability. They found that, in a lexical decision task,
processing of predictable words was facilitated, decisions on
incongruous words were inhibited, and decisions on congruous but less
predictable words were unaffected by the frame. Kleiman (1980) not
only supported the finding that highly predictable sentence
completions were responded to more quickly than less predictable
words, but extended the effect by showing that strong semantic
associates of the highly predictable endings were also processed more
quickly than were unassociated controls. Stanovich and West (1979,
1981) have interpreted results in word pronunciation tasks using
incomplete sentence contexts as being consistent with the Posner-
Snyder (1975a. 1975b) theory of automatic spreading activation.
Stanovich and West suggest that facilitative effects initially arise
from the automatic activity of the word processing system,
independent of conscious attempts to predict upcoming words.
Inhibitory effects, by this account, result from strategies which can
only be invoked when there is sufficient time to use the context as a
10
basis of guessing, as in the sentence frame experiments, or when
processing is slowed by degraded text.
These sentence frame experiments make it clear that the
information provided by a single sentence is capable of influencing
word processing. However, the bearing of these results on normal
reading processes is a source of debate. The sentence frame
technique requires a decision rule about when to present the target
item. Whatever the rule used, there must always be a delay between
showing the penultimate word in the sentence and presentation of the
final, target item. This delay provides more processing time than is
typically used in normal reading of the same material. Consequently,
the predictability of the target word may be more of a factor in
these studies than it is in normal reading. In addition, the final
word in a sentence often receives extra processing time, called
"sentence wrap-up" (Carpenter & Just. 1977). The relationship
between sentence wrap-up and simple word processing is not known, nor
is it addressed in the experiments using the sentence frame
technique. Presumably, this wrap-up time involves some work to make
the representation of the sentence internally coherent. The delay
could provide time to process the sentence frame more deeply as well
as time to guess the identity of the upcoming word. In either case,
the processing taking place before the final, target word appears is
unusual by comparison with normal reading and may seriously distort
the results.
Various techniques have been developed to reduce these
11
methodological problems and to more nearly approximate normal
reading. Mitchell and Green (1980). for instance, used a continuous
lexical decision task, in which no particular word or sentence
location was singled out for special attention. In addition, their
stimuli were part of extended prose passages. They found that
lexical decisions to words in a coherent context took approximately
the same amount of time as lexical decisions to the same words in
scrambled passages. These results suggest that context, even grossly
defined as coherence, may have little impact on word recognition.
Another technique for studying sentence processing is self-paced
reading, in which time to report comprehension of some portion of a
text, usually a sentence, is measured. Garrod and Sanford (1977)
observed reading times for sentences containing either a category
name (e.g.. vehicle) or an exemplar of that category (e.g., bus). A
previous sentence provided the context for the target sentence by
containing the other word (i.e., if the first sentence had a category
name, the second had an exemplar of that category; if the first had
the exemplar, the second contained the category name). Garrod and
Sanford also used exemplars which varied in conjoint frequency
(production frequency of the exemplar given the category name;
roughly equivalent to typicality). Reading time on the second
sentence was faster if it contained the category name and the first
sentence contained the exemplar than if the opposite case held. This
is consistent with the view that the exemplar implies the category
name, so when the exemplar appears first, processing of the second
12
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sentence containing the category name does not require an infer
to determine that the two Items are coreferential
. When the category
name appears first, the exemplar cannot be assumed, so processing is
necessary to connect the two words.
For both orders of category and exemplar, there was a
significant conjoint frequency effect if the two words were actually
coreferential. Across several experiments, the conjoint frequency
effect in the exemplar-first, category-second case diminished if the
two concepts were not coreferential (e.g.. where the first sentence
referred to a "bus" and the second sentence referred to a "horse-
drawn vehicle"). These results were interpreted as indicating that
the effects of these associated words was taking place in a text
integration process, not during encoding operations which might be
affected by an automatic spread of activation. The effect of
associative strength, indicated by conjoint frequency, was dependent
on the interpretation of the two associated words. Garnham (1981)
has reported consistent results in a similar experimental paradigm.
When the first sentence contained a category name, but also
information which suggested the appropriate exemplar (e.g., "The tool
drove home the nails."), the reading time for the second sentence,
which contained the exemplar (e.g., "The hammer had been damaged.")
was faster than in a comparison condition in which the first sentence
named the category but was neutral with respect to the exemplar
(e.g., "The tool lay beside the nails.").
While studies using general reading time techniques can
13
demonstrate interesting aspects of the reading process, they cannot
test very specific predictions about the nature of context effects.
For instance, the Garrod and Sanford (1977) results are explained by
integration effects, but in each experiment there are differences
which could be due to automatic processes. General reading time
cannot distinguish between effects which occur on a specific word, as
automatic facilitation might be expected to do. and effects which are
spread across some larger portion of the sentence.
With the development of an accurate technology for measuring the
activities of the eyes, new possibilities for understanding the
details of the reading emerged. The crucial advancement resulting
from the eye tracking technology has been the ability to monitor
momentary changes in processing at very precise locations in the
sentence in a relatively unobtrusive way. Not only is the reader
able to engage the text in a more normal way than is possible with
other techniques of studying reading, but the experimental variables
can be made less conspicuous, reducing task specific strategies.
The first study to use eye movements to investigate the effects
of context on semantic information was conducted by Zola (1979).
Probability of fixating a target noun and fixation duration on the
target noun were observed in conditions where the word immediately
prior to the target noun was either a highly predictive adjective
(e.g., "buttered popcorn") or an appropriate, but not predictive
adjective (e.g.. "adequate popcorn"). Zola's results showed only
weak context effects on word processing. The probability of fixating
the target noun was independent of the predictiveness of the
preceding adjective. The predictive adjective did reduce fixation
duration on the noun, but the effect was small. Overall, the results
suggested that semantic context may have little effect on processing
words in normal text.
The fact that contextual information has little impact on
processing under the most restrictive conditions cannot rule out all
varieties of context effects. Ehrlich and Rayner (1981) reported two
experiments which were similar to Zola's, but which relied on a more
global conception of context. Longer passages were used to produce a
clear thematic context. The target word was either highly consistent
with the context or it was appropriate, but not likely. In another
experiment, the comparison word was not only unlikely, but also
anomalous. The probability of fixating a target word within a
passage was significantly greater if the target word was inconsistent
with the meaning of the passage. If the word was semantically
consistent with the passage, its predictability did not influence the
likelihood of fixating the word. Predictability did, however,
influence fixation time in cases where the word was fixated. The
more likely word in the context required less processing time as
measured by fixation duration than did the word which was merely
consistent with the context.
In reconciling their findings with Zola's, Ehrlich and Rayner
point out some potential methodological difficulties In the earlier
study. In particular, all of Zola's target nouns were quite long (7
15
or 8 letters). Rayner and McConkie (1976) demonstrated that words of
that length will almost invariably be fixated (93% likelihood), so
processes controlling the probability of fixating a word may be
dominated by a stronger word-length factor in Zola's study. This
confound would reduce the effectiveness of probability of fixating
the target as a measure of processing difficulty.
Ehrlich and Rayner 's results argue that fixation time, which
presumably reflects some aspects of processing time, is influenced by
global context. Their study indicates that the degree of consistency
of a word with the overall context can affect immediate processing of
that word. However, since global context was developed over several
sentences, it does not tell how rapidly the context can be organized
thematically to allow the reader to decide what is or is not
consistent. Zola's (1979) failure to find strong priming effects
suggests that information that is too subtle or too recent may not be
as effective in facilitating word processing as is clear thematic
information which the reader has had the opportunity to evaluate and
elaborate.
As a general conclusion, studies of sentential context and
discourse context can certainly be said to have shown that such
information can influence word processing. Several questions have
been raised in this section. The first concerns the degree to which
normal reading is influenced by contextual information. As more
naturalistic techniques have been developed for studying reading
(i.e., on-line eye tracking), evidence for immediate sensitivity of
16
the reader to contextual information has begun to accumulate.
However, just what processes are reflected in this immediate response
is not yet known. A second question concerns the source of
contextual information. While the global context provided by a
discourse topic does seem to affect momentary word processing,
evidence about local information, such as that contained within a
sentence, having a similar effect is less clear. Some studies find
little influence of local contextual information while others find
clear influences of prior information within the sentence. Again,
these varying results lead naturally to the question of what aspects
of word processing are affected by contextual information. Ehrlich
(1983), for example, has distinguished word identification, the
singling out of a word in the lexicon, from word interpretation,
establishing a word in the sentence or discourse representation.
Both types of effects may be operating in normal reading. This broad
distinction is only the first step in specifying a clear model of
context effects in reading. The next section will review evidence
for interlexical effects on several aspects of word processing.
Semantic Priming
The study of context has received a great deal of attention at
the level of individual words affecting the processing of other
words, vniile such studies use procedures quite unlike any aspect of
normal reading, some processing mechanisms and the underlying
knowledge of words and of conceptual relations are presumably the
17
same as those which make reading possible. Techniques used in
studying relations between isolated words have the distinct advantage
of allowing the experimenter define specific stimulus relations and
to specify the way the stimuli are to be processed. This is
different from natural reading tasks because subjects, except in
developmental studies, are already expert readers with unique and
well-practiced styles, while they generally have little experience
making speeded lexical decisions or verifying if two words belong to
the same category.
Three questions will be addressed in relation to single word
priming experiments. First, what factors affect the persistence of
associative effects? In reading connected text, many words and
concepts may intervene between two associated words. If unrelated
intervening words or the simple passage of time have a dampening
effect on associative priming, then this level of contextual
influence may not be relevant to normal reading. The second question
is: what is being speeded by associative facilitation? The lexical
decision task is intended to measure a very early stage of word
processing. Yet. there are a number of possible sources of
facilitation. Activation may lower the threshold of consistent
incoming featural information, allowing the lexical representation to
be located more quickly. On the other hand, the period of processing
involving encoding of the physical stimulus may be entirely free of
effects of semantic context, being solely driven by visual
information. If this were the case, some decision process following
18
the initial activation and location of the word in the lexicon would
need to be used to account for semantic facilitation. The third
question is: what kinds of relations produce semantic facilitation?
Words are related in many ways. Frequently, connected nouns
constitute a limited set of such relations. The degree to which
semantic facilitation might be expected to figure importantly in
reading will somewhat depend on the range of the phenomenon.
At the outset, it may be useful to define semantic priming and
to outline a general framework for describing it. Priming can be
said to have occurred when the processing of one word is facilitated
by the prior processing of another. This earlier processing could
involve the same word, some related word, or a related domain of
information. While the contribution of priming to daily mental
activity is not clear, the phenomenon has become an important tool
for investigating the structure of information in memory. The
priming technique forms the core of the study of semantic memory.
For instance, in the lexical decision task, subjects are required to
decide if various letter strings are words or a meaningless group of
letters, Meyer and Schvaneveldt (1971) had subjects make lexical
decisions on simultaneously presented pairs of letter strings. They
included some word pairs which were closely associated with one
another (e.g., BREAD BUTTER) and compared lexical decision times with
those for pairs which had no strong association (e.g., DOCTOR
BUTTER). Decision times for associated pairs were found to be faster
than for unassociated pairs.
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It is generally assumed that, in this kind of task, the subject
reads the words sequentially. Reading one word leads to accessing
its representation in semantic memory. This contact with the
semantic memory representation leaves the information about that
particular word in a residual state of activation. Associative
priming is explained by assuming that related concepts are also
activated. Perhaps the most popular way of conceptualizing this
associative priming has been through a model in which activation
spreads through a network of concepts, starting at the word being
accessed and moving in a decreasing gradient through related
concepts. Semantically related concepts are assumed to be closer in
the network than semantically unrelated concepts; consequently, the
more related concepts are more highly activated (see esp.. Collins &
Loftus, 1975).
The first question that was raised above about semantic priming
concerned its persistence across intervening information and time.
Scarborough. Cortese, and Scarborough (1977) presented words in a
long list for successive lexical decisions. They found that
repetition of a word reduced lexical decision times with as many as
32 items intervening between its first and second appearance. This
persistent facilitation in a simple decision task is consistent with
the idea that a concept once accessed maintains some activation above
its resting state.
The work of Schvaneveldt and Meyer (1973) has usually been
considered the strongest demonstration of the persistence of
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associative priming across intervening material. They used lists
composed of three words (e.g., DOCTOR BUTTER NURSE). Within these
triples, any pair of words could be semantically associated, the
third word being either an unassociated word or a nonword. Various
combinations of unassociated words and nonwords were also included.
The task was to decide if all three letter strings were words.
Decision times on triples containing two associated items separated
by an unassociated word were about the same as decision times for
triples containing adjacent associates and the unassociated word as
either the first or last word. The control condition, with three
unassociated words, showed significantly slower decision times.
These results support the idea that associative relations speed
processing of the associates and that these effects persist across at
least one intervening item.
Some other studies have raised questions about the persistence
of interlexical priming across materials. Gough, Alford. & Holley-
Wilcox (1981) presented words and pronounceable nonwords in an
unbroken list, asking for a lexical decision on each item in
sequence. Within this list were some associated words, the number of
intervening items varying from none to 32. In effect, Gough. et. al.
combined the technique used by Scarborough, et. al. (1977) with the
stimuli used by Schvaneveldt and Meyer (1973). Only a small effect
of association (approx. 20 msec) was found when there were no
intervening words, and little if any effect was found when
intervening material separated associated items. In a related study.
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Foss (1982) found no effect of semantic relatedness on phone.e
nionitoring times for words in lists, with amount of intervening
material varied. However, the relatedness effect did appear across
various distances when the materials were presented in sentences.
These incongruous findings force us to question the robustness
of association effects based on the notion of activation spreading
automatically between linked concepts, particularly when there is
intervening material. If the limited demands on working memory made
by the triads presented by Schvaneveldt and Meyer (I973) allowed
subjects to maintain activation of both the first and second words
while the third was being processed, then their results cannot be
taken to strongly support a model of inhibitionless and automatically
spreading activation.
Time is the other factor which could influence the persistence
of associative priming. Neely (1976) distinguished automatic spread
of activation, which arises quickly but may also decay quickly, from
strategic processes involving generation of expectancies and matching
of general semantic features. Strategic processes take time to arise
and have consequences for processing other words. When consistent
information appears subsequent to strategic priming, facilitation of
processing occurs. When the new information is inconsistent, there
is inhibition. Neely (1977) varied the stimulus onset asynchrony
(SOA) between a two associated words, the first acting as a prime and
the second as the target in a lexical decision task. Automatic
priming effects appeared with a 250 msec SOA with no corresponding
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inhibition for misprising. These automatic effects began to diminish
With a 700 msec SOA. at about the same time that conscious
expectations began to influence processing.
The first question asked how persistent lexical priming effects
are in relation to factors relevant to sentence processing. The
answer seems to be that priming can be maintained over time and over
Intervening words, but conscious attention may be necessary to
accomplish this. There may be a difference between characteristics
of priming of a word by itself and priming of a word by its
associates. The former requires no spread of excitation, merely
residual activation, while the later does assume that excitation has
flowed between related words.
The second question concerns the locus of facilitative effects.
Meyer. Schvaneveldt
.
and Ruddy (1975) and Becker and Killion (1977)
found that semantic context interacts with stimulus degradation in
both lexical decision and pronunciation tasks. Word frequency,
presumably an intermediate factor affecting processes between those
slowed by degradation and those initiating semantic priming, did not
interact with degradation (see also Stanners, Jastrembski, &
Westbrook, 1975). The conclusion they have drawn from this is that
semantic priming can speed the encoding of a word.
A series of experiments by Rosch (1975), using a different
experimental task, categorization time, led to similar (though
ambiguous) results. In Rosch's task, a category name (e.g., BIRD) or
a neutral warning signal was presented, followed two seconds later by
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the appearance of a pair of words shown simultaneously in a
tachistoscope. The subject's task was to decide if the two new words
were in the same natural language category as one another or in
different categories. The words varied in the degree to which they
were representative of some category. m some cases, both were
highly typical exemplars of a category (e.g.. SPARROW ROBIN) and in
other cases, both were low typicality exemplars of the same category
(e.g.. TURKEY PENGUIN). In the critical condition, the same exemplar
was repeated (e.g.. ROBIN ROBIN). For these comparisons, the
category membership decision could actually be made on the basis of
physical identity, since a word is always in the same category as
itself.
There was a strong typicality effect (faster processing for more
typical exemplars) for physically identical word pairs, but only when
they were primed by a category name. No typicality effect occurred
when the exemplar was unprimed (the neutral warning signal). Primed
high typicality items were processed faster than were unprimed high
typicality words, but priming actually slowed processing for low
typicality words in comparison to the unprimed words. This
interaction was unique to the physically identical pairs. When the
judgment was made on two different exemplars, priming and greater
typicality both speeded processing, but they did not interact. In
other experiments, Rosch demonstrated that the interaction of
typicality and priming for physically identical pairs was not due to
the generation of a concrete set of physical features as a result of
2H
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knowing the category na.e. These results were interpreted as showin
that typicality influences perception as well as later decisi
processes: "...at least at one level of perception, the meaning of
pictures and of words is part of the actual perception of the
stimuli, not something inferred after the perception occurs. "(Rosch.
1975. p. 226).
Massaro. Jones. Lipscomb, and Scholz (1978) review some
difficulties with Rosch's conclusions and suggest that her results
could also be explained by post-encoding operations. In both lexical
decision and word naming tasks, they found that priming speeds
processing of both high and low typicality exemplars, but only with
visually degraded stimuli. When the stimuli were not rotated 180
degrees, there was no effect of typicality or priming in either task.
Similar results have been reported by Sanford. Garrod. and Boyle
(1977). Massaro. et. al. conclude that advanced knowledge of
category membership has no effect on perception when the stimulus
information is good, but that it helps considerably when the visual
input is somehow degraded.
Interestingly. Massaro, et. al. are not willing to say which of
their stimulus degradation conditions produces behavior closer to
that in reading. Stimuli in the normal orientation are closer to
words actually encountered in reading. However, the extra processing
load and various other processes taking place during reading, but not
in their experimental tasks, may make the stimulus degradation
condition closer to reading from the perspective of the processing
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system. The same might be said of Rosch's (1975) results. The
processes involved in dealing with the repeated stimulus (physical
identity condition) may reveal the kind of activation affecting eye
movement control if the eyes respond to the encoding process. On the
other hand, the additional processes required to decide if two
different words are from the same category may be closer to the
combined encoding and evaluation processes which make up reading. If
eye movements respond to both word identification and word
interpretation processes, the decision about different exemplars from
the same category (category identity condition) may be the more
appropriate comparison to normal reading. These contrasts may not be
categorical, but rather related to the abilities of the reader.
Stanovich (1980) has argued that poor readers depend more on context
in identifying words than do good readers. Degraded stimuli or task
strategies may serve the odd function of making good readers behave
like poor readers.
Although the evidence for facilitation of the encoding process
by semantic information is somewhat limited, there is little doubt
that post-encoding processes are affected by semantic relatedness.
Most models of semantic memory discuss primes as aids to decision
processes about semantic relations (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975;
Glass & Holyoak, 1975; Landauer & Meyer, 1972; Lorch, 1980; Smith.
Shoben, & Rips, 1974). These models rely heavily on the sentence
verification task and, in most cases, the class inclusion relation
(e.g., A ROBIN is a BIRD). Semantic relatedness (variously defined
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as featural overlap of the sentence arguments. associative
relatedness. or semantic distance) predicts both facilitation of
judgments when the sentence describes a correct relationship and
inhibition of certain judgments when that relationship is not real
(e.g.. A BAT is a BIRD). The cognitive mechanisms proposed to deal
with such decision processes generally locate facilitative and
inhibitory processes at an evaluation stage in which the semantic
information is fully available to the system (see Smith. 1978. for a
review of many of these models).
The third question raised at the beginning of this discussion
concerned the types of semantic relations which lead to priming
effects. Two kinds of information which are strongly facilitated by
prior processing have already been discussed: words with strong
incidental associations (DOCTOR NURSE) and words sharing some
category membership or dominance relation (BIRD SPARROW).
McKoon and Ratcliff (1979) have shown that priming is not
dependent on semantic connections built up over long experience.
They briefly taught people new associates (e.g.. CITY GRASS) and
found that priming in a lexical decision task was equivalent with
these items and with pre-experimental associates (e.g., GREEN GRASS).
Thus, it seems that concepts only arbitrarily related to one another
can quickly be placed in a relationship which facilitates processing.
This is a capability which is necessary if a facilitative context is
to be built by a reader who encounters newly paired concepts during
normal discourse processing. Such an ability would greatly increase
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the relevance of semantic priming effects in normal language
processing, because their occurrence would not be limited to cases of
generic associations built up over extensive experience.
In a related study. Ratcliff and McKoon (1978) found that
priming effects can be guided by the prepositional structure of the
representation of a text. Words from a proposition facilitated
recognition for other words in the same proposition independent of
physical distance between the words in the actual text. In a
different set of experiments (Ratcliff and McKoon, 1981) subjects
briefly studied short sentences and were subsequently tested for
recognition. In the particular experiment of interest here, subjects
saw five sentences for five seconds each. A test phase followed
immediately in which recognition memory was tested. A prime word was
displayed first and was read without response by the subject. Then a
second, target word appeared and the subject decided whether or not
the target had appeared in one of the study sentences. The SOA
between the prime and the target was varied between 50 and 800 msec.
Facilitation effects appeared with SOAs as short as 150 msec.
Inhibition effects on judgments primed by words from another string
did not appear until the SOA reached ^50 msec.
The results of the various studies by McKoon and Ratcliff
suggest that episodically created relationships can be activated very
quickly and automatically. Two cautionary points are necessary,
however. First, McKoon and Ratcliff's techniques rely strongly on
item repetition, which has been shown to be very robust priming
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phenomenon. Repetition
.ay be important for re-establishing
contextual information (of.. Kintsch 4 van Dijk's. 1978. model), but
context effects are generally taken to include much more. Second,
their subjects studied the stimulus sentences for a considerably
longer time than a reader typically spends reading the same sentence
in connected text. As with several other techniques discussed
previously, the generalization of these priming effect to normal
reading can only be made with caution.
In this section, the phenomenon of priming has been explored
briefly. Priming is a powerful and robust phenomenon. Its
occurrence is so pervasive and reliable that priming is frequently
perceived as more of a technique than a psychological phenomenon
requiring explanation. Nevertheless, the study of priming, what
causes it and what are its limits, is an important part of cognitive
research. Some of the most influential work on permanent memory has
studied the effect of processing one lexical items on processing
another under various timing constraints, processing tasks, and
relationships among items. This section has reviewed a part of that
literature in an attempt to discover what light it might shed on the
relationship between stored information and ongoing processing.
Several question were raised at the beginning of this section.
The first question concerned the persistence of priming effects.
Time itself seems to be no problem, but active rehearsal of the prime
and perhaps of the possible primed items may be necessary to maintain
activation. Intervening material does not seem to interfere with
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pricing Of repeated Items. This Is not necessarily the case for
priming between assoolatlvely related Items, about which the evidence
is contradictory.
The second point was that priming can be shown to influence
several levels of processing. Only the general distinction between
encoding levels and decision processes has been made here. The data
do not allow the inference that both kinds of processes are typically
influenced. Priming phenomena seem to affect encoding most strongly
when processing is made more difficult by some experimental
manipulation (e.g.. degradation of the visual stimulus). How these
results relate to the processing of text by good readers is still not
known
.
Finally, priming effects do not seem to be confined to a small
set of lexical relationships. There is evidence that priming
connections can be established very quickly and can allow selective
search through a propositional memory structure. Nevertheless, it is
still not known if the kinds of text representations that a reader
usually creates are similar to those resulting from these
experimental tasks. Furthermore, reliance on word repetition to
study contextual priming may not permit generalization to a broader
class of phenomena.
On the Availability of Information
Research studying moment-by-moment processes in language
understanding has increasingly supported the contention that much of
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the work Of comprehension is done as each word is fixated. Ambiguous
words are quickly disambiguated (Swinney. 1979; Seidenberg.
Tanenhaus. Leiman. & Bienkowski, 1982). anaphoric references are
immediately sought upon encountering a pronoun (Ehrlich & Rayner. in
press), and improper parsing of ambiguous sentences is noted when
clarifying information appears (Frazier & Rayner. 1982). Words are
not simply buffered in an uninterpreted lexical string until there
are enough items to make a clause. At least some processing for
meaning takes place as the reader reads each word. In this section,
some recent work on the problem of momentary processes of language
comprehension will be discussed. Two general theoretical approaches
will be distinguished, interactive and subsystem models. The section
will close with a brief discussion of context as stored memory
information.
Carpenter and Daneman (1981) provided a compelling demonstration
of the fact that incoming words receive an immediate interpretation.
Readers' eye fixations were monitored as they read sentences aloud.
The sentence stimuli contained homographs that were ambiguous with
respect to the preceding context (e.g.. "Some of the best BASS
guitarists/ catchers in the country would come to the spot."). Later
portions of the sentence containing the ambiguity determined the
proper reading. The spoken protocol indicated that readers initially
tended to choose the more frequent reading of the ambiguous word.
However, both the spoken behavior and the eye movement data indicated
that, in the cases where the inconsistent reading was chosen, the
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errors were detected at the first disambiguating word. Fixation
times on the disambiguating word were significantly shorter when the
consistent reading was chosen. Regressive fixations from the
disambiguating word back to the homograph were also more likely when
the ambiguous word had been given the inappropriate pronunciation.
Just and Carpenter (1978) found a similar effect when the
disambiguating context was provided by a previous sentence. Subjects
read sentence pairs, such as (1).
(1) The millionaire WAS MURDERED/DIED on a
dark and stormy night.
The KILLER left no clues for the police to
trace.
Fixation time on KILLER was longer after the DIED context sentence
than after the MURDERED context sentence. Carpenter and Just suggest
that, for the DIED context condition, the reader must make an
indirect inference that the man was murdered when the word KILLER is
read. For the MURDERED sentence, the inference is direct and
requires less processing time. This inference is made immediately
upon encountering the word KILLER and is reflected in the longer
fixation time on the word KILLER for the DIED context sentence.
Readers also show an immediate response to a pronoun. Ehrlich
and Rayner (1983) studied fixation times on pronouns appearing in
paragraph contexts. Each pronoun had a specific referent which
appeared some variable distance prior to the pronoun. The durations
of the fixation on the pronoun and of several subsequent fixations
indicated that the reader was immediately seeking the referent for
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the pronoun. The difficulty of this search was directly related to
the distance separating the two words.
Finally, a study by Swinney (1979) has shown that, although the
reader initially accesses multiple meanings of an ambiguous word,
this ambiguity is resolved in favor of the contextually appropriate
reading within 750-2000 msec. Swinney presented spoken sentences
which contained an ambiguous word (e.g.. "The man was not surprised
when he found several BUGS in the corner of his room."). m some
cases, the sentence was clearly biased toward a particular reading of
the ambiguous word (e.g., "The man was not surprised when he found
several spiders, roaches, and other BUGS in the corner of the room.")
A visually presented word appeared either immediately after the
ambiguous word or three syllables later. This word was biased toward
one or the other of the readings of the ambiguous word (e.g.. INSECT
and SPY here). Lexical decision times on the visual item indicated
that multiple readings of the ambiguous word were initially actived.
priming both visually presented targets. When the lexical decision
was delayed, only the contextually appropriate reading of the
ambiguous word maintained facilitation. In a similar experiment,
Seidenberg, Tanenhaus, Leiman, and Biekowski (1982) have found
evidence for contextual disambiguation with an SOA between
presentation of the ambiguous word and onset of the lexical decision
item of only 200 msec, indicating that the influence of context
arises very quickly.
These examples demonstrate that a meaningful context can
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innnediately or very quickly affect the processing of words in
sentences. The reader or listener is continually monitoring the
Incoming message for coherence and. presumably, is building a
representation of the sentence which conforms, at least to some
degree, with internal logical and semantic demands. This description
of language comprehension is a general characterization which almost
any theory of sentence processing will need to assume.
Some models of language comprehension rely heavily on
semantically interpreted contextual information to enable and guide
on-line sentence processing. These will be referred to as
interactive models. The interactive approach has been most closely
associated with the work of Marslen-Wilson (Marslen-wilson. 1975;
Tyler & Marslen-Wilson. 1977; Marslen-Wilson. Tyler. & Seidenberg.
1978). The theory of reading proposed by Just and Carpenter (1980)
is also in the interactive category. The common characteristic of
this class of models is the idea that the reader is thought to be
building a single representation of a sentence based on the
contributions of many different sources of information.
The primary evidence for Marslen-Wilson 's interactive model has
come from experiments in which subjects shadow fluent speech.
Sentences which are highly constrained pragmatically can be shadowed
at a faster rate and show a higher proportion of corrected
mispronunciations than do less constrained sentences. The argument
made from this data is that shadowers, even those staying very close
to the spoken message, are able to use all of the possible data, even
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some requiring full comprehension of the relationship between the
word being spoken and the meaning of the sentence, to guide
pronunciation.
In a somewhat different task. Marslen-Wilson
,
Tyler, and
Seidenberg (1978) assessed the degree to which semantic information
and syntactic structure could facilitate word processing. Subjects
monitored spoken sentences for either a word rhyming with a cue or a
word in the same semantic category as the cue. Identification time
was measured. Sentences were constructed so that two syntactic
readings were possible up to the point that the target (rhyme or same
category) word appeared, as can be seen in (H).
(la) Although Mary rarely cooks TROUT, when she does
so it tastes delicious.
(Mb) Although Mary rarely cooks. TROUT is one thing
she prepares well.
There was no difference in response times for the two tasks.
Although the rhyme monitoring task was assumed to tap an earlier
level of processing, the information necessary for the response was
available with about the same speed in the category monitoring task.
For both tasks, the case where the target was in the initial clause
led to faster processing than in the case where a clause boundary
preceded the target. The boundary condition interacted significantly
with the informational completeness of the first, biasing clause. If
the clause was judged to be an informationally complete unit,
boundary effects were very strong. When the first clause was judged
to be incomplete, the impact of boundary was greatly reduced.
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The Marslen-Wilson. et. al. (1978) study is interpreted as
demonstrating that low levels of information about a word (rhymes)
are affected by sentence structure in the same way as higher levels
are (category membership). The same pattern of effects obtained for
the two tasks. m addition. differences in effects for
informationally complete and informationally incomplete initial
clauses suggest that availability of information between clauses is
not entirely syntactically constrained. The informativeness of a
unit seems to be evaluated by the language processor using all kinds
of information, including syntax. Informationally complete first
clauses both facilitated monitoring of the word within the first
clause ma) and slowed processing of the word after the boundary (Mb)
in comparison with the low completeness first clause sentences. (It
should be noted that prosody was not controlled in this study. The
speaker's judgment of completeness may have been reflected in the
intonation, particularly at the end of the clause, leading to a
syntax by prosody interaction.)
The interactive approach has tended to concentrate on all the
kinds of information that ARE available to the language processor,
arguing that many sources of knowledge enter immediately into the
representation process. An alternative is to ask what kinds of
information ARE NOT available at a particular time or under certain
conditions.
Models which emphasize the limitations on access to information
(most notably, Forster, 1979) tend to view the processing system as
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organized into subsystems, each with a unique source of informati
on Which to draw and each developing a characteristic representati
Of the sentence. This class of models will be called subsystem
«>odels. In Forster's theory, words which have been accessed are
initially represented in a form compatible with general grammatical
constraints of language. Grammatically complete units (constituents,
but not necessarily as large as clauses) are evaluated for coherence
with the text or discourse. Thus, language processing is thought to
proceed through several distinct serial stages of representation
before the comprehension process is complete.
Forster's model recognizes the fact that there are serious
limitations on the amount of information which can be processed at a
given time. The language processing system must deal with a complex
stimulus in order to extract a message from the physical signal.
Frazier (1978; Frazier 4 Fodor, 1978) has developed a view of
language understanding which attempts to account for the way that the
language processor deals with capacity limitations in the face of
rapidly incoming information. According to this model, the
processing system initially organizes the input according to
grammatical constraints on sentence well-formedness. In cases where
there are several possible constructions of the sentence fragment,
the processor has specific strategies (e.g.. Minimal Attachment and
Late Closure) which are, in essence, attempts by the system to
organize the input into the most efficient representation consistent
with its limited capacity. In some cases, these strategies will be
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incorrect and the system will need to create a new representation of
the sentence when the error is detected.
A critical notion in Frazier's model is that there is a unique
syntactic representation of the sentence constructed on-line. This
syntactic representation has temporal priority over other
representations based on pragmatic information. Testing this idea.
Rayner. Carlson, and Frazier (in press) conducted a study to evaluate
the contributions of pragmatic and syntactic constraints and
preferences in sentence comprehension. They compared reading
behavior for sentences such as those in (5).
(5a) The florist sent the flowers
...
(5b) The performer sent the flowers
...
These fragments could be simple active sentences constituting the
first clause of a complex sentence, as in (5a').
(5a') The performer sent the flowers and was pleased
with herself.
Alternatively, these fragments could be the subject of a sentence
along with a reduced relative case (i.e., "The florist who was sent
the flowers..." with WHO left out), as in (5b').
(5b*) The performer sent the flowers was pleased
to receive them.
Using either PERFORMER or FLORIST as the subject of these sentences
pragmatically biases the reading of the sentence toward either the
simple active reading (viz., florists are likely to be the senders of
flowers) or the reduced relative reading (viz., performers are likely
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to be recipients of flowers).
Subjects reported their interpretation of the sentences after
reading and understanding them. There was a tendency to report the
pragmatically biased reading of the sentence. However, fixation
times on the disambiguating final region of the sentence indicated
that readers initially chose the simple active reading of the
sentence, changing this interpretation only with some effort when the
sentence structure made it impossible or when later evaluation made
it less plausible. These results are not consistent with the
interactive view discussed earlier. Clearly, a reader taking all the
available information into account would prefer the pragmatically
biased reading of the sentences initially, but pragmatic preferences
did not appear until later in the reading process.
Why would a language processing system develop a complex
internal structure (e.g., a serial processing system)? And why would
an efficient processor ignore available and potentially useful
information (e.g.. that performers receive flowers)? The class of
interactive model described above have the virtue of simplicity.
These models do not assume any particular organization to knowledge
or priority for any particular kind of representation. All the
information that the language processor can use will, ostensibly, be
used
.
Interactive models rely for their simplicity on the assumption
that all knowledge is approximately equally accessible and that there
is no cost to the system, in the sense of straining limited
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processing resources, in using various kinds of knowledge. The
limited resource problem arises because sentence processing certainly
does tax working memory. For instance, the fact that even as
unimposing a stimulus as a click is perceptually displaced toward
sentence boundaries (Fodor. Bever. & Garrett. 1974) would suggest
that sentence processing is a demanding task. Of course, some
information is available without effort. Automatic priming has been
discussed in relation to semantic and lexical information. Most
syntactic processing appears to proceed without conscious control and
may be automatic. But automatic availability of contextual
information is never an explicit part of these interactive models nor
is it an empirically justified assumption.
The debate about processing demands in language processing
centers on the use of contextual information and the degree to which
it influences processing. From the perspective of the language
processing system, most of context is information that has been
stored in memory. Presumably, this information is organized and
represented in some internally coherent way that makes later
retrieval possible. In this sense, contextual information is
available to the language processing system whenever it might want
it, just as other information stored in memory is available.
Furthermore, there is little doubt that this contextual information
can be useful for comprehension. For example. Bransford and Johnson
(1972) showed that thematic information, not unlike that which a
reader might be expected to extract from a text, can make an
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otherwise anomalous set of sentences fit together into a coherent
story. Similarly, the sentence frame experiments reviewed earlier
Clearly demonstrate that stored knowledge can facilitate word
processing. However, the question which arose in discussion of the
sentence frame experiments concerned the degree to which the language
processor takes advantage of the information available under normal
reading conditions. Stimulus degradation, delaying the onset of the
text during reading, and other such experimental techniques can
encourage the use of processing strategies which are unusual or even
irrelevant in normal circumstances.
The information stored in memory is potentially available, but
the important question is whether or not it is accessed. Long term
memory experiments demonstrate that retrieving information from
memory takes time and that facts retrieved from memory must be
evaluated, since incorrect information is often the product of a
search for even well-learned information (Anderson. 1976; Hayes-Roth
& Thorndyke. 1979). Not all information is equally available
(Fletcher. 1981; Kintsch 4 van Dijk. 1978; Walker & Meyer. 1980). but
the likelihood of retrieving useful information cannot be evaluated
until the search has been attempted. It is a reasonable assumption
that memory for context is no less prone to error than is memory in
tasks employing well-learned materials and most contextual
information cannot be considered automatically available.
Language processing can be considered, to some extent, a memory
problem. Two general classes of models were discussed in this
aeotlon: mteraotlve models and subsystem „odeU. Interactive
models have been criticized for their failure to take two aspects of
memory seriously: the limited capacity of working memory and the
limited availability of contextual information. Subsystem models
have been built on an explicit recognition of the limitations on
working memory. This recognition of the accessibility problem takes
the form of a refusal to assume that context must have an effect on
all levels of processing. Yet. even in these models, the problem of
accessibility of stored information is not dealt with explicitly.
CHAPTER II
SOME TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS
This section will serve two purposes. First, it will contain a
description of the eye tracking apparatus used in the experimental
tasks, serving as a slightly expanded apparatus section. Second, the
particular scoring system used in this study will be explained. No
unambiguous or generally accepted system for deciding how the
behavior of the eye is related to visual processing yet exists, but
there is a considerable amount of work that has been done and more in
progress attempting to improve our understanding of the eye-mind
relationship. The scoring method used in this study has attempted to
remain within the bounds defined by the empirical work discussed in
the second part of this section.
The Eye Tracking System
Eye movements were recorded by a Stanford Research Institute
Dual Purkinje Eyetracker which was interfaced with a Hewlett Packard
2100A computer. Horizontal and vertical coordinates of the position
of the right eye were sampled by computing an average position each i|
msec and comparing that to the previous 1 msec. A characteristic of
the particular program used in these studies was that any fixation of
less than 100 msec in duration was discarded. Distributions of the
fixation time data from the current experiments indicated that the
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100 msec cutoff nominally truncated the distribution on the side of
fast fixations, slightly exaggerating the positive skew typical of
reaction time distributions. At worst, only a small percentage of
the fixations was lost. What is more, loss of this data probably
worked in a conservative direction, reducing the size of the
facilitative priming effects estimated by the data.
A record of the eye's position on the text and of individual
fixation durations was stored on computer disk for later analysis.
The position of the eye could be determined accurately to 10 min. arc
across both the horizontal and vertical axes. Fixation times were
accurate to a single millisecond.
Stimuli were presented on a Hewlett Packard 13OO Cathode Ray
Tube (CRT) in standard lower case format. The operating program did
not permit capital letters to be presented. Subjects were warned
prior to the experiment that the first word in sentences, the
beginnings of proper names, as well as the personal pronoun "I" would
not be capitalized. Subjects were questioned and reported no
difficulty in adapting to this particular stimulus characteristic.
Each letter presented on the CRT was composed of dots from a 5 X
7 matrix. The subject was positioned i\6 cm from the CRT so that
three character spaces subtended a visual angle of one degree. This
position was maintained by using a bite plate molded to the
individual's teeth at the start of the experimental session. This
bite plate was mounted in a stationary position in front of the CRT.
The subject was seated throughout the experiment in a chair adjusted
1(4
for comfort.
The testing roon, was dark except for an Indirect light source
Which allowed the experimenter to adjust the eye tracking system as
necessary. At the beginning of the experiment, the luminance of the
CRT was adjusted to a comfortable level for the subject. In some
oases, a slight dimming of the display was necessary to maintain
tracking as the experiment progressed. Such adjustments were kept to
a minimum.
The Scoring System
The record from each subject in the usual eye tracking
experiment is a series of fixation locations and the corresponding
durations of the fixations. The record itself is unambiguous to the
limits of the eye tracking system, but the pattern of the data
requires interpretation.
The area around the fixation from which a reader can acquire
information in sufficient detail to process a word is approximately 7
or 8 character spaces to the right of the center for fixation (Rayner
& McConkie, 1977; Rayner & Bertera, 1979) and to the beginning of the
currently fixated word if it is no more than 4 character spaces to
the left (Rayner, Well. & Pollatsek, 1980). Assuming the typical
pattern of left-to-right reading, the processing of a word must be
completed during the time that the eye is within a very restricted
range. This range is strongly asymmetrical to the right.
There seems to be little question that at least some processing
^5
Of a word occurs while it is being fixated. This is the time that
the featural information about the word is clearest. There is.
however, some uncertainty about when this processing begins. The
extent of the perceptual span makes it quite possible that initial
word processing occurs on some fixation prior to the time that the
word is placed in the center of fixation. Rayner. McConkie. and
Ehrlich (1978) and Rayner. McConkie. and Zola (1980) have argued that
the information extracted from a word in the parafovea includes its
length and some abstract information about its first few letters.
The fovea is usually defined as an area one degree to either side of
the center of fixation. The parafovea extends five degrees to either
side of the center and the periphery is beyond that. Approximately
three typed characters occupy one degree of visual angle from the
normal viewing distance.
The asymmetry of the perceptual span argues that processing may
not be entirely limited to the fovea. In fact. Rayner and Slowiaczek
(1981) have argued that a 5-letter word starting two and one-half
character spaces to the right of the center of fixation should be
completely identified, although their claim was about a case where
there was no interfering information in the fovea. Ehrlich and
Rayner (1981) found that readers of normal text were equally likely
to fixate or skip alternative consistent words, even if one was more
predictable in the context, but that they were more likely to fixate
an anomalous word. Thus, words not in the center of fixation must
have been processed to a level that permitted evaluation of meaning
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in relation to the rest of the text.
Processing of an immediately subsequent word is apparently
possible and occasionally occurs, but the perceptual span does not
seem to absolutely determine information intake or. if it does, not
all the information is used. This has prompted several experimenters
to say that the eye is directed to the next word that has not been
identified, rather than moving to the limits of the perceptual span
(McConkie. 1983; Rayner 4 Pollatsek. 1981; Zola & McConkie. 1982).
The scoring system which was used in the present experiment was
a variation on the "gaze duration" scoring system advocated by
Carpenter and Just (1977). Gaze duration is the sum of the durations
of all fixations on a particular word during the first pass through
that region of the sentence. This is consistent with the idea that
the eye is usually directed to the most "convenient viewing position"
in a word of a given length (determined from parafovea information)
and that an additional fixation may be necessary if the entire word
has not been adequately processed (O'Regan, 1981; Rayner. 1979).
O'Regan (1979) has noted that short saccades. such as those which
tend to occur within words, are unlikely to be due to a need for
additional visual detail. He has suggested that the reason for these
closely located fixations may be an attention shift related to
processing difficulties.
While using the sum of all fixations on a word as an indication
of total processing time for the word may be slightly problematic,
this measure seems likely to capture most of the range of momentary
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word and sentence comprehension processes. Error could be introduced
if summing two or more fixations inflates the estimate of processing
time for a word. This could happen because there is a minimum time
that the eye must stay at rest before it is able to move (Rayner.
Slowiaczek. Clifton. & Bertera. 1983; Salthouse & Ellis. 1980). T^e
assumption of gaze duration that two fixations of 200 msec, for
instance, are equal to one fixation of HOO msec may not be true,
since the decision to make the additional fixation within the word
commits the eye to at least 180 msec on the word regardless of how
much extra time is actually needed. However. Rayner and Morrison
(1981) found substantial savings in lexical decision and naming times
when subjects moved the eye only one degree rather than holding
fixation. Holding a fixation is apparently a drain on central
processing resources, making it possible that longer fixations result
in slower processing than occurs in the normal fixation. In addition
the quality of visual information falls off rapidly as it diverges
from the fovea. Consequently, making a new fixation on the same word
may be more efficient from the view of both processing time and
likelihood of misidentifying the word.
Gaze duration was used here as the basic measure of processing
time for a particular word. In cases where the word was skipped
entirely, the word was assumed to have been processed on the fixation
immediately prior to the saccades over the word if that prior
fixation occurred within a region 5 character spaces to the left of
the first letter of the word (McConkie & Underwood, 1981).
CHAPTER III
EXPERIMENT 1
Everyday experiences and the results of many psychological
studies agree that thinking about one idea tends to bring related
ideas to mind. This pervasive phenomenon should, it would seem,
affect the reading process where ideas are aroused and combined. One
influential model of how related concepts affect each other was
proposed by Collins and Loftus (1975) and elaborated by Loftus
(1975). In the model, concepts are represented as nodes in an
associative network and accessing a particular word or concept is
described in terms of activating the entry for that item in the
semantic network. Activation of a particular entry spreads to and
activates related concepts. These neighboring concepts are connected
to the accessed concepts either through direct links or through
intermediate concepts.
Many details of the spreading activation model are not important
here, and the Collins and Loftus (1975) model represents a class of
models using the same descriptive framework. Three characteristics
of the model are important for understanding Experiment 1. First,
the spreading activation view claims that the degree of activation of
a concept is determined by the degree of relatedness of a word to the
prime. The more closely two words are associated or the more the
meanings of two concepts overlap, the greater the facilitative effect
of activation of one word on processing the other.
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The second claim is that, although activation does spread
through a semantic network, facilitative effects are not necessarily
confined to decision processes about meaning relations. In theory,
it is possible that encoding operations or lexical selection
processes could be influenced by the activation of semantic
information. Such effects are usually described as top-down
influences of semantic relations on earlier stages of processing.
A third but noncritical claim of the spreading activation model
is that the process is automatic. Autoraaticity is taken to mean that
activation of concepts related to context takes place independently
of conscious effort to influence related information. This sense of
automaticity is similar to that developed by Shiffrin and Schneider
(1977; Schneider & Shiffrin. 1977) in which a triggering stimulus
inevitably leads to some process or processes, of which activation of
associates could be one. The reason that this claim is not
considered logically necessary in the present case is because many
priming effects are equally compatible with certain models in which
the reader is believed to be constantly predicting upcoming lexical
items, sometimes consciously.
Spreading activation has been used to explain a number of
priming phenomena, among them the typicality effect (Loftus. 1975).
Typicality is a measure of the degree to which an example of a
concept fits the prototypical conception of a more general category.
As such, typicality reflects something about the meaning of a word in
the context of its general category rather than some absolute quality
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of the word.
The context produced by the category name reduces processing
time on exemplars of that category (Rosch. 1975). The spreading
activation model explains facilitation in processing an exemplar as
excitation which has been initiated by processing of the category
name and had spread to associates of the category. Exemplar
typicality reflects. to some extent. associative strength.
Therefore, along with other associates of the category name, some of
which may not be exemplars, the exemplars are activated in proportion
to their degree of association.
The internal organization of categories, reflected in exemplar
typicality, provides the basis of the predictions for the first two
experiments. The effect of context is hypothesized to prepare the
reader to encode some class of appropriate words by activating those
words and reducing the activation needed from a physical stimulus to
permit the concept to be accessed.
Typicality should be a very useful vehicle for detecting
facilitation of encoding. Taking variation in fixation time as a
pure measure of encoding time (as do explanations which account for
fixation time effects by variations in encoding time), processing
should be faster for high typicality words than for low typicality
words, but only in the presence of the category context. With a
neutral context, there should be no advanced excitation and. thus, no
facilitation of encoding.
The sentence stimuli for the first experiment paired a category
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na.e with an exemplar of that category, several intervening words
separating the two ite.s. The exemplar was either a very good .e.ber
Of the category (a high typicality exemplar) or an acceptable, but
unexemplary exemplar (a low typicality exemplar). Differences in
typicality reflect differences in associative strength, but there is
presumably some associative connection to low typicality exemplars as
well as to high typicality exemplars. These word pairs were embedded
in a sentence frame which was written to be as neutral as possible
with respect to the category and the exemplar up to the point that
the exemplar appeared. The alternative category members were equated
for word length and for standard rated frequency to reduce simple
lexical effects.
One of the stimulus sentences is shown in (la).
(la) The salesman said that the cloth was
actually cotton which had been dyed.
The general category is CLOTH and the high typicality exemplar is
COTTON. By changing the exemplar, an alternative version of the
sentence can be created, as in (lb).
(lb) The salesman said that the cloth was
actually canvas which had been dyed.
Presumably, typicality effects in word processing are eliminated if
the category context is not invoked. In sentence frame (1), this can
be accomplished by replacing the category name with a more neutral
word, as in (1c).
(1c) The salesman said that the stuff was
actually cotton which had been dyed.
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A low typicality version of this neutral sentence can be created by
replacing COTTON with CANVAS.
As indicated above, category priming should interact with
exemplar typicality according to a spreading activation model. The
exact form of this interaction is difficult to specify. There are
two reasonable possibilities. (1) The effect of a category prime
could be entirely facilitative. but to a different degree for words
of different typicality levels. Inhibition is generally thought to
be the result of mispriming: a prime inappropriate to the response.
If this is the case, then the priming effect should occur for all
members of the category, but the facilitation should be more
pronounced for the high typicality than for the low typicality word.
This would produce a converging interaction. The processing time for
high typicality words would always be less than or equal to that for
low typicality words (referred to as a typicality effect) but the
priming effect would be larger for high typicality words than for low
typicality words. (2) Loftus (1975) has suggested that high
typicality words may be so strongly activated that access to low
typicality words is hindered. If this is so, a crossover interaction
might be expected, with the high typicality item in the primed case
processed more quickly than in the unprimed case, but the primed low
typicality word actually processed more slowly than the unprimed low
typicality word.
One other characteristic of spreading activation is studied in
the first experiment. Activation of a concept is assumed to arise
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Quickly and to dissipate over ti.e unless reactivation occurs
(Collins and Loftus. 1975). While time is difficult to manipulate in
a Situation where the subject controls the rate of viewing the
stimuli, precise control is really not crucial. By varying the
amount of material to be read between the prime and the exemplar, the
relative priming interval can be manipulated with some certainty. In
the present experiment, delay was controlled by inserting a phrase or
a relative clause between the two critical words, as in (Id).
(Id) The salesman said that the cloth which they
thought was so pretty was actually cotton whichhad been dyed.
If activation dissipates over delay and intervening material, the
extra material should reduce the size of the priming and typicality
effects. At best, we might expect the early levels of priming to be
maintained over the longer delay period if the reader continues to
focus on the category information. This would be a haphazard effect,
since the sentences were not written to make the category name be the
topic or focus, though that was surely the case frequently. In the
neutral condition, no category priming should have taken place, so
the delay should have little effect.
Experiment 1 has a dual purpose. First, it is a test of the
predictions of a spreading activation model that: (a) interlexical
facilitation should spread word processing in the reading of prose;
and (b) the degree of facilitation should reflect both semantic
relatedness (typicality) and the location of the source of activation
(priming). Second, the experiment is a test of the hypothesis that
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fixation tl^es reflect processes occurring at the level of encoding
and lexical access.
Method
Subjects, Sixteen members of the University of Massachusetts
community were paid to participate in the experiment. All subjects
had normal uncorrected vision. Approximately half had never
participated in an eye movement experiment before.
Apparatus. The eye tracking system has been described in detail in
Chapter 2.
W^^"
^ arrived, a dental impression was made
using a fast-hardening dental plastic. This bite plate was then
mounted in a standard position in front of the CRT. The subject's
chair was adjusted for comfort. During this initial period, the
subject was allowed to adapt to the darkened room.
Calibrating the eyetracker took an average of 20 minutes, but
varied considerably from subject to subject. This process consisted
primarily of the experimenter finely adjusting the position of the
subject's head to maximize reflection of light from the eye.
Accurate tracking was tested to the horizontal and vertical limits of
the tracking system. When tracking was achieved, a cross extending
.5 degrees in the vertical and horizontal directions around the
center of fixation could be projected on the CRT. This cross
followed the eye as it moved across the screen. Prior to
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presentation of each sentence during the experiment, this cross
appeared and could be used to check the continuing accuracy of the
calibration. The overlap of this cross with a fixation cross at the
beginning of the stimulus sentence allowed the experimenter to
determine when to initiate a reading trial.
Subjects were given a brief explanation of the workings of the
eyetracker. The purpose of the experiment was described in general
terms as a study of what the eyes do when people read. Participants
were told to read normally and for comprehension, as closely as they
would read a textbook they were studying. Memorization was
explicitly discouraged. Instead, they were to read so that they
could reproduce a close approximation of the sentence if asked to do
so. Rereading was permitted, but subjects were told that a single
pass through the sentence would usually be sufficient for
comprehension.
Selection of Materials. Typicality ratings were obtained for
exemplars from 50 of the Battig and Montague (1969) categories.
Using instance dominance (i.e., likelihood of producing an instance
given a category name) as a rough guide, exemplars were selected from
the norms to create two distinct groups, one of very high instance
dominance and one of moderately low instance dominance. To avoid
idiosyncratic associations, extremely low instance dominance items
were avoided. The number of exemplars selected from each category
was not constant, but the average number was 16. Twenty-two judges
rated the category exemplars on a 7-point scale using Rosch's (1975)
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Instructions.
Two exemplars from each category were chosen using the followin
criteria. (1) One item was selected from the three or four words
having the highest typicality ratings for that category. (2) A
second word was selected from the medium to low typicality range. To
avoid words which might be considered nonmembers. no word with an
average rating of less than 6 (with 7 as the lower extreme) was used.
(3) Each potential word pair was checked for lexical frequency using
the Kucera and Francis (1967) norms. An attempt was made to keep the
two exemplars in a pair as close as possible to one another in
frequency. The high typicality items had a mean typicality rating of
1.5^ (Uhighest rating) and a mean word frequency of 30.58. Low
typicality items had a mean typicality rating of 11.28 and a mean
lexical frequency of 28.0. A complete listing of typicality and
frequency ratings for the pairs of exemplars can be found in Appendix
A. (i|) The two words in a pair had the same number of letters.
A sentence frame was written for each category. Insertion of
the category name and either one of the exemplars into the frame
created a natural English sentence. The information contained in the
sentence frame was intended to be neutral with regard to the category
and its exemplars up to the point (from the perspective of a
systematic left-to-right reader) that the exemplar was encountered.
The position in the frame for the exemplar always followed that for
the category name, though never immediately. A prepositional phrase
or a relative clause always followed the exemplar to avoid a mixture
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Of end-of-3e„tenoe slowdown effects such as those discussed by Just
and Carpenter (,980) with processing ti^e for the critical word, the
exemplar.
Each sentence frame had eight versions, produced by orthogonal
combinations of Exemplar Typicality. Prime Type and Priming Interval.
An example of a sentence frame in each of its eight forms can be seen
in Table 1. Exemplar Typicality was manipulated by using a high
typicality word in the exemplar position in half of the sentences and
a low typicality word in the other half. The two levels of Prime
Type were Category Prime and Neutral Prime. Sentences involving the
Category Prime had the category name in the sentence. For the
Neutral Prime sentences, another word that was appropriate for the
sentence replaced the category name. The Neutral Prime was a less
informative word than the category name, bearing only a very general
relationship to the exemplars. In most cases, the following common
words served this function: thing, stuff, man, guy. and fellow. The
final factor was the relative distance between the prime and the
exemplar. Relative priming interval was varied by inserting a
relative clause or a phrase between the two critical words. This
additional material was written to be linguistically appropriate
while not being constraining with respect to the category and its
exemplars. Appendix B contains a list of the stimulus sentences used
in Experiment 1.
Stimulus Lists. Stimulus sentences were presented one at a time to
the subject. Each sentence occupied two to four lines on the screen.
TABLE 1
An Example of Different Forms of
a Stimulus Sentence from Experiment 1
SHORT PRIMING INTERVAL
PRIMED
HIGH TYPICALITY: The salesman said that the cloth was
actually cotton which had been dyed.
LOW TYPICALITY: The salesman said that the cloth was
actually canvas which had been dyed.
UNPRIMED
HIGH TYPICALITY: The salesman said that the stuff was
actually cotton which had been dyed.
LOW TYPICALITY: The salesman said that the stuff was
actually canvas which had been dyed.
LONG PRIMING INTERVAL
PRIMED
HIGH TYPICALITY: The salesman said that the cloth which
they thought was so pretty was
actually cotton which had been dyed.
LOW TYPICALITY: The salesman said that the cloth which
they thought was so pretty was
actually canvas which had been dyed.
UNPRIMED
HIGH TYPICALITY: The salesman said that the stuff which
they thought was so pretty was
actually cotton which had been dyed.
LOW TYPICALITY: The salesman said that the stuff which
they thought was so pretty was
actually canvas which had been dyed.
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With a ll„lt Of ,2 charactera per line. All lines, except the last
one in three or four line sentences, were of approximately the sa.e
length. The exemplar was never the first or last word on a line.
A subject saw only one of the eight versions of each sentence
frame and sentences were never repeated In a list. Each stimulus
list contained five sentences In each of the eight experimental
conditions. Each sentence frame appeared an equal number of times in
each of its eight versions across lists. Except for these
constraints, assignment of a sentence frame to a particular condition
Within a list was random.
Twenty filler sentences appeared in each list. These were
written to be of similar length and concreteness to the experimental
sentences; however, they did not contain category-exemplar relations.
The first two sentences of each list were fillers. Beyond this, the
order of presentation of all sentences, experimental and filler, was
random.
Results
Approximately 10? of the trials yielded no data because of track
losses due to blinks and return sweeps. In another 6% of the cases,
the critical region, the area around the target exemplar, was not
fixated. Thus the average number of observations for a subject in a
given condition was approximately four. An average of 67 data points
contributed to the 16 subject means in each of the eight cells formed
by orthogonal combination of the two levels of each of the three
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experimental variables.
The mean priming interval was calculated from the beginning of
the first fixation on the category name to the beginning of the first
fixation on the exemplar. This measure is analogous to the stimulus
onset asynchrony (SOA) between prime and target words in studies in
Which timing is under the experimenter's control. The mean priming
interval for all sentences in the short delay condition was m msec
and for sentences in the long delay condition. 124? msec.
Three factors were entered into a completely within subjects
analysis of variance: Exemplar Typicality. Prime Type, and Priming
Interval. Processing time for targets in the short delay condition
(X
= 253) was 6 msec longer than in the long delay condition (X = 2^17
msec). This difference was not significant (F < l.O; S.E.D. =
7.097). Priming Interval did not interact with either of the other
two factors (both F's < 1.0).
Table 2 shows the mean processing times in milliseconds for
Experiment 1 separated by levels of priming and exemplar typicality.
The means are averaged across the non-significant Priming Interval.
Exemplars following a Category Prime were processed an average
of 28 msec more quickly than those following a Neutral prime. This
main effect of Prime Type was significant (F[1.15] = 5.782; p < .028;
S.E.D. = 11.7^2 msec). High typicality exemplars were processed a
mean of 21 msec more quickly than were low typicality exemplars, a
highly significant effect (F[1,15] = 11.703; p < .OOH; S.E.D. = 6.289
msec). Prime Type and Exemplar Typicality did not significantly
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TABLE 2
Mean Fixation Durations on Target Exemplar
for Stimuli in Experiment 1
(Times Are Shown in Milliseconds)
EXEMPLAR TYPICALITY
HIGH LOW
bird.
. .sparrow bird
.. .vulture
PRIMED 226 2^14
thing.
. .sparrow thing.
. .vulture
UNPRIMED 252 276
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Interact (F < l.o).
An analysis of the=e san,e data using sentences as a random
variable was osed to help evaluate the generality of these effects.
The delay factor, which was not significant In the analysis by
subjects, was not included. This decision eliminated the need to
estimate several means for which no data were available for a
particular Item from any of the four subjects. Consistent with the
earlier analysis, main effects for both Prime Type (F[1.39] = 6.57; p
< .025; S.E.D. = 11.05 msec) were significant. The Interaction term
was not significant (F < 1.0).
Discussion
Experiment
1 was a test of a spreading activation model of
interlexical priming. That model suggested that priming stems from
processing some related word or concept contained in the prior
context. Processing a concept produces a flow of excitation which
activates related concepts. These related concepts subsequently
require less excitation from their visual features for activation of
their lexical entries until activation has diffused.
The spreading activation model predicted that the category name
should produce excitation of the exemplars of that category. In
addition, strength of association between the category name and the
exemplars, reflected in Exemplar Typicality with a High Typicality
exemplar more strongly associated with the category name than the Low
Typicality exemplar, should have produced different amounts of
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excitation. The results of Experiment 1 were consistent with these
predictions. There was a significant
.ain effect of Pri.e Type, the
Category Prime producing faster word processing than the Neutral
Prime. There was also a significant effect of typicality for
exemplars preceded by the category name. Finally, consistent with
Foss (1982). the effect of priming and typicality did not diminish
over time and intervening materials, as was shown by the lack of an
effect of the Priming Interval factor.
The spreading activation model is based on the idea that
excitation is initiated by prior processing of an associate.
Exemplar Typicality, resulting from differential association of
exemplars to the category name, should be irrelevant in the Neutral
Prime condition. This, however, was not the case. High typicality
exemplars were processed significantly more quickly than were low
typicality exemplars in the Neutral Prime condition. In fact, the
overall effect of Exemplar Typicality was actually greater in the
Neutral Prime case than in the Category Prime case.
While these results cannot be fully explained by a spreading
activation model, a set of processes described by Loftus (1975) to
explain some results of Rosch (1975) can provide an account of the
results consistent with spreading activation as a part of the
explanation. According to Loftus. processing a category name excites
exemplars of the category, just as was proposed above. Thus, at the
time that the meaning of the exemplar is accessed, only the exemplars
primed by the category name would show a typicality effect. A second
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stage of processing is necessary to explain the typicality effect
following a Neutral Prime. For the category decision task. Loftus
(1975) proposed that there was a decision stage In which the subject
had to retrieve a category name in order to decide if two words were
both in the same category. If the category name had already been
processed (i.e.. if it was the prime), then its retrieval was
accomplished with approximately equal speed from exemplars of various
typicality levels. Thus, the typicality effect produced by spreading
excitation from a category name was not greatly exaggerated by the
decision stage.
The decision stage, according to Loftus, produces a typicality
effect for unprimed words. Words preceded by a Neutral Prime are
accessed without facilitation from the residual excitation produced
by a related word. However, if the subject's task requires that the
category name be found, the appropriate category will generally be
more accessible to a high typicality exemplar than to a low
typicality exemplar. A typicality difference will result, reflecting
task-related retrieval processes.
The reader's task could be thought of as the creation of a
coherent representation of the meaning of a sentence. An
uninformative word, such as the Neutral Prime, may make this task
more difficult for the reader. While it is not likely that the
specific category name is what is retrieved to identify the Neutral
Prime, the sentence frame limits the concepts which the reader could
use to clarify the sentence. Presumably, the more precise the
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sentence frame in this experiment, the more limited the number of
concepts the reader can use for clarification.
There are some results from Experiment 1 which are consistent
With this View. Table 3 presents the means from the Experiment 1.
including the Priming Interval, which was not a statistically
Significant factor. While the typicality effect is stable across the
two Priming Intervals for the Category Prime items, this is not true
for the Neutral Prime words. With only a short delay, there is
little effect of typicality for words preceded by a neutral word (an
11 msec difference between high and low typicality exemplars). With
a longer interval, the typicality effect increases dramatically (a 38
msec difference). This change is entirely due to the fact that the
high typicality exemplar in the Neutral Prime condition is processed
much more rapidly when there is a long interval than when the
interval is short.
The fact that the two priming conditions seem to respond
differently to the Priming Interval is consistent with the idea that
they reflect different processes. The stable typicality effect for
exemplars following the Category Prime across the two Priming
Intervals could indicate that these concepts reach a particular level
of activation determined by their relatedness to the prime and that
this activation is maintained throughout the time the sentence is
processed.
Exemplars from both typicality levels are presumably encoded at
the same rate following the Neutral Prime, but the activity of
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TABLE 3
Mean Fixation Durations on Target Exemplar for Stimuli
in Experiment 1, Including the Delay Variable
(Times Are Shown in Milliseconds)
SHORT DELAY
EXEMPLAR TYPICALITY
HIGH LOW
bird. .sparrow bird. .vulture
PRIMED 224 246
thing. .sparrow thing. .vulture
UNPRIMED 265 276
LONG DELAY
bird sparrow bird vulture
PRIMED 228 244
thing sparrow thing vulture
UNPRIMED 238 276
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fitting the exemplars into the representation of the sentence, the
second stage, is not equivalent for the two typicality levels. If it
is assumed that the sentence frames are more compatible with the high
typicality exemplars than with the low typicality exemplars,
particularly when there is intervening material, then this second
stage could account for the typicality difference following the
Neutral Prime. The assumption of differential compatibility is not
entirely arbitrary: the sentences were written to house the category
names and are arguably more suggestive of typical aspects of the
categories than of atypical aspects. Take the example from Table 1.
The sentence frame in the Long Priming Interval case up to the point
in the sentence that the exemplar appears is given in (2).
(2) The salesman said that the stuff which they
thought was so pretty was actually...
Cotton is easily imagined to be pretty, canvas only with more effort.
"Stuff which they thought was so pretty" does not help the reader
guess cotton or canvas or even cloth, but once the exemplar is
encountered, the high typicality version may fit the frame more
easily.
While the explanation based on Loftus (1975) appears to account
for the results of Experiment 1, there is reason to be skeptical.
The lack of an interaction in the observed results of the experiment
is explained by two offsetting interactions at different stages of
processing (the primed items showing a typicality effect only at
encoding and the unprimed items only at the sentence representation
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stage). The support for this view co.es mainly from accepting the
pattern of
.eans in Table 3. ignoring the fact that neither the
Priming Interval main effect nor the three-way interaction of Priming
interval. Exemplar Typicality, and Pri.e Type even approached
significance, as they should have if the means are to be believed.
There is an alternative explanation which remains truer to the
statistical results. According to this view, the typicality effect
for the Neutral Prime condition is incompatible with the spreading
activation model, so spreading activation is rejected entirely. The
main effects of both Prime Type and Exemplar Typicality could arise
from integration of information into the sentence representation, the
second stage of the explanation based on Loftus (I975). This
explanation assumes that there is no facilitation of encoding in the
Category Prime conditions: regardless of context and typicality, the
exemplars (which are controlled for factors which might affect
initial access, such as frequency and length) are encoded at the same
speed. Instead, the following assumption is made: when the meaning
of the exemplar is accessed, this meaning is added to the growing
representation of the sentence and checked for its coherence; and
this coherence is more easily established if the category name is in
the sentence than if the Neutral Prime word must be inferred or
clarified using the exemplar. As in the earlier explanation.
Exemplar Typicality may simply reflect the ease with which the
concepts at the different levels of typicality fit the sentence
frame. Thus, this explanation relies entirely on a process of
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e.tabU3hi„g internal coherence of the sentence or the relationship
between the sentence and Its larger context. A sl.llar proposal was
-de by cairns. Cowart. and Jablon (,98,). who suggest that a „ore
consistent context reduces the amount of Hidiscourse-relevant
information carried by a word. The Integration process, which arises
after the lexical Item Is accessed. Is facilitated, reducing the
processing time for the word.
To summarize. Experiment 1 did not support the original
predictions made from a spreading activation model of contextual
priming. However, the results do not permit a choice between a
modified spreading activation explanation and an explanation based
entirely on post-access processes of establishing internal coherence
of the sentence. Experiment 2 was designed to help make this choice.
CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENT 2
The results of Experiment 1 cannot be explained entirely within
the spreading activation framework outlined above. One viable
explanation of those results retained spreading activation as an
processing factor, but added a second stage which involved sentence
integration. Alternatively, spreading activation may not be a factor
at all: post-access sentence integration processes may entirely
account for processing time differences.
Experiment 2 attempted to separate these two explanations. The
degree to which the sentences were compatible with the exemplars at
the two typicality levels was experimentally manipulated by using
sentences similar to those in Experiment 1. but having the category
name modified in such a way that it was more compatible with either
the high or the low typicality exemplar. Take example (3a).
(3a) The singing bird was apparently the sparrow
which we had seen earlier.
This sentence uses a modifier, singing, to emphasize a feature of a
highly typical bird: singing is a very birdy thing to do. Thus
modified, the sentence is very compatible with the "sparrow"
exemplar. The frame, however, does not fit as well with the low
typicality exemplar, as in (3b).
(3b) The singing bird was apparently the vulture
which we had seen earlier.
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People find it slig.tly strange (though not anomalous) to say that
the sound produced hy a vulture constitutes singing. This sentence
frame, then, should reproduce the original sentence frame effect
especially that found in the Long Priming Interval case in which thl
intervening information was thought to bias the sentence frame in the
high typicality direction. The opposite effect, in which the low
typicality item is underscored, can be effected simply by changing
the adjectival modifier of the category name to be more compatible
with the low typicality exemplar, as in (3c).
(3c) The circling bird was apparently the vulture
which we had seen earlier.
Circling is a common characteristic of vultures, but not of birds in
general and especially not of song birds. Thus, a high typicality
bird does not fit this sentence frame as well as does the low
typicality word, as can be seen in (3d).
(3d) The circling bird was apparently the sparrow
which we had seen earlier.
The spreading activation view predicts that a differential effect for
levels of Exemplar Typicality will be produced by excitation of the
exemplar concepts by the category name. Any additional effect of
compatibility of the exemplar with the sentence frame, which in this
experiment includes the modifier, will not influence the magnitude of
the typicality difference. Thus, spreading activation predicts that
the typicality effect found in the first experiment should appear
again in the second experiment. In cases where the sentence frame is
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biased in the sa.e t^pio.Ut, direction as the exe.pUr. the
typicality effect should he maintained or increased. Moreover, when
the fra.e and exemplar biases do not agree, the typicality effect
Should be produced by the exemplar-category relation, but there may
follow some post-access slowdown to resolve exemplar-frame
differences. This second stage, in which confusion is resolved.
Should not be greater at one typicality level than at another. The
effect Should be additive, as priming was with typicality in
Experiment 1.
The alternative view, which explains word processing time as a
result of the time necessary to establish a coherent representation
of the sentence, predicts that the differential effects of levels of
Exemplar Typicality will be determined by the compatibility of the
exemplar with the meaning of the sentence. The typicality effect,
according to this explanation, should disappear and be replaced by a
compatibility effect. A low typicality exemplar in a low typicality
context should be processed at approximately the same rate as a high
typicality exemplar in a high typicality context. A mismatch of
Exemplar Typicality and the bias of the context sentence should
produce a slowing of processing time similar to the slowdown in
processing of low typicality exemplars in Experiment 1.
The second experiment also attempted to mimic the conditions
assumed to have produced the results found in Experiment 1. The
discussion of Experiment 1 suggested that the sentence frames might
have been more compatible with the high typicality exemplar than with
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the low typicality exemplar. In Experiment 2. a context manipulated
to be biased in the direction of the high typicality exemplar should
reproduce this effect. Sentences in Experiment 2 using a Category
Prime have already been discussed. As in Experiment 1. sentences
were presented using the Neutral Prime, but these were also biased by
using the same set of modifiers, as shown in (3e).
(3e) The singing thing was apparently the sparrow
which we had seen earlier,
(3e) is a high typicality-biased Neutral Prime sentence with a high
typicality exemplar. Naturally, the low typicality exemplar,
vulture, could replace the high typicality exemplar, sparrow.
In Experiment 1, clarifying information in the Long Priming
Interval case presumably produced the typicality effect for the
Neutral Prime case by making the sentence frame more compatible with
the high typicality exemplars than with the low typicality exemplars.
The same result should be produced by biasing the Neutral Prime
sentences with a modifier which is highly characteristic of the
proper category.
Method
Subjects, Thirty-two members of the University of Massachusetts
community were paid to participate in this experiment. All
participants had normal uncorrected vision. Only two of these people
had ever been in an eye movement study before, but neither had been
in an experiment in this study.
The e.ulp„ent used 1„ this expeK^ent is aescMbe. i„
Chapter 2.
f-edur- The procedure was similar to described Tor Experiment 1.
However, the stimuli for this experiment were mixed with those from
Experiment serving as distractors for one another. The procedure
required by Experiment
^ was somewhat different from that used in the
first experiment in that subjects learned some associations between
words and phrases at various points during the experiment and used
these associates to help understand some sentences.
^^"^^"^^ ^^^^^^ were constructed for a subset of the
categories using the following guidelines. The category name was
always contained within the initial noun phrase (NP) of the sentence.
For each category name, two modifiers were selected, one which was
biased toward the high typicality exemplar (e.g.. singing bird
-
sparrow) and one biased toward the low typicality exemplar (e.g..
circling bird
- vulture). Unlike the first experiment, the syntactic
structure of these sentences was under certain constraints. The
category name was part of the subject NP and the exemplar was part of
the direct object NP. Only verbs and adverbs intervened between the
category name and the exemplar. The exemplar was part of a simple NP
consisting of only the definite article and the exemplar. The
exemplar was always followed by a "which" or "that" relative clause.
Each sentence frame had eight different versions, which resulted
75
ime
and
from a factorial combination of two levels of three factors: Pr
Type (Category Prime vs Neutral Prime). Exemplar Typicality.
Context Bias (Consistent or Inconsistent). Consistency in th
context Bias factor refers to the relationship between the exemplar
(high or low typicality) and the modifier used with the category
name. Table
^ gives an example of a sentence in each of the eight
versions. The priming and typicality manipulation was produced in
the same way that it was accomplished in the first experiment.
Sentence bias was created by use of a modifier for the prime word.
The prime and the exemplar were in the same clause in all sentences
in Experiment 2.
Eight lists of 2il sentences were constructed. Each list
contained six sentences in each of the four experimental conditions
formed by sentence bias and exemplar typicality. These were within-
subjects factors. Each list contained either all category name
primes or all neutral primes, making this a between-sub jects factor.
Assignment of a particular version of a sentence to a list was
otherwise random. These sentences appeared in the same lists as the
stimuli for Experiment ^1. A complete list of stimuli from Experiment
2 can be found in Appendix C.
Results
Processing time on the exemplar was determined using the same
method as in Experiment 1. There were two critical analysis. The
first analysis compared processing time for sentences at two levels
TABLE H
An Example of Different Forms of
Stimulus Sentence from Experiment 2
CONSISTENT BIAS
PRIMED
The singing bird appeared to
be the sparrow which we had
seen earlier.
The circling bird appeared to
be the vulture which we had
seen earlier,
UNPRIMED
The singing thing appeared to
be the sparrow which we had
seen earlier.
The circling thing appeared to
be the vulture which we had
seen earlier.
INCONSISTENT BIAS
PRIMED
HIGH TYPICALITY: The circling bird appeared to
be the sparrow which we had
seen earlier.
LOW TYPICALITY: The singing bird appeared to
be the vulture which we had
seen earlier.
UNPRIMED
HIGH TYPICALITY: The circling thing appeared to
be the sparrow which we had
seen earlier.
HIGH TYPICALITY:
LOW TYPICALITY:
HIGH TYPICALITY:
LOW TYPICALITY:
LOW TYPICALITY: The singing thing appeared to
be the vulture which we had
seen earlier.
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Of category typicality (Exemplar Typicality) in relation to the bias
Of the sentence fra.e.
.ore compatible with either the high or the
low typicality exemplar (Sentence Bias). The processing times for
these conditions can be found in Table 5. Sentence Bias is described
in terms of consistency. A sentence biased in favor of a high
typicality exemplar is consistent with that high typicality exemplar
and inconsistent with a low typicality exemplar. Similarly, a
sentence biased towards a low typicality exemplar is consistent with
the low typicality exemplar and inconsistent with the high typicality
exemplar. The main effect of Exemplar Typicality was not significant
(FC1.15]
= 1.605; p > .20; S.E.D. = 13.6I5) nor was the effect of
Sentence Bias (F[1.15]
= 2.687; p = .119; S.E.D. = 10.9^^3). The
interaction also did not achieve significance (F < 1.0).
The second analysis was similar to that in Experiment 1 because
it contained Category Primes and Neutral Primes (Prime Type). The
other factor was Exemplar Typicality, high and low. The data from
the Category Prime condition were also used in the previous analysis.
The mean processing times for this analysis can be seen in Table 6.
In all cases, the modifier biasing the sentence in favor of the high
typicality exemplar was used. The main effect of Exemplar Typicality
was not significant (F < 1.0; S.E.D. = 11.055) nor was the main
effect of Prime Type (F < 1.0; S.E.D. = 1^1.999). The interaction of
Exemplar Typicality and Prime Type did achieve significance (F[1,30]
= ^.2^6; p = .0^16). Table 6 shows that the significant interaction
is mainly attributable to a 35 msec difference in the Category Prime
TABLE 5
Results of Experiment 2 for Stimuli
Containing a Category Prime Only
(Times Are Shown in Milliseconds)
EXEMPLAR TYPICALITY
HIGH LOW
singing bird... sparrow circling bird.
. .vulture
CONSISTENT 226 24?
circling bird... sparrow singing bird.
. .vulture
INCONSISTENT 2^16 261
TABLE 6
Results of Experiment 2 for Stimuli
in a High Typicality Context Only
(Times Are Shown in Milliseconds)
EXEMPLAR TYPICALTTY
HIGH LOW
Singing bird... sparrow singing bird.
. .vulture
PRIMED 226 261
circling thing... sparrow singing thing.
. .vulture
2^13
UNPRIMED 253
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on
on
condition between processing tl.e To. the hlgH topicality ana the low
typicality exemplars Ct = 2.2,,; ,r = 30: p <
.05,. since there 1,
only a 10 msec typicality difference ln fh^jr uxii i the reverse direction (t <
1-0). The 27 ™sec Prl^e Type effect for the high typicality
exemplars was not quite significant (t =
,.759: df = 30: p < .,0, and
the
,8 .seo reverse pricing difference for low typicality exemplars
did not even approach significance (t = 1.155; df = 30; p > .20).
Discussion
Experiment 2 was designed to distinguish spreading activati
effects on initial encoding of exemplars from post-access integrati
processes. In the first analysis, which compared Exemplar Typicality
and Sentence Bias for sentences containing a category prime, none of
the effects was significant, so this data must be considered
inconclusive. The data used in the first analysis are. however,
interesting and suggest an answer to the question they were intended
to bear on, as can be seen in Table 5. The 20 msec typicality effect
for exemplars in the Consistent Prime condition is about the same as
the 19 msec typicality effect for Category Prime exemplars in
Experiment 1. In addition, the actual values of the mean processing
times are almost identical in the two experiments for these
conditions.
If the typicality effect from Experiment 1 was entirely due to a
post-access integration process, the typicality effect should have
been replaced by a consistency effect. This did not happen. Again
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ignoring the fact that the differences were not significant, there
was an Exemplar Typicality difference regardless of the consistency
Of the bias of the context sentence with the exemplar. On the other
hand. Sentence Bias did affect processing, apparently by slowing word
processing when the context was not consistent. There was a slightly
greater effect of an inconsistent sentence on a high typicality
exemplar (20 msec slowdown). Based on these results, the two-stage
model of sentence processing following Loftus (1975) is more
consistent with the first two experiments than is a model attributing
all processing time differences to a single post-access stage.
A second set of sentences was chosen to reproduce the effects of
Exemplar Typicality and Prime Type from Experiment 1. In particular,
the typicality effect for the Neutral Prime condition in the first
experiment was primarily due to fast processing of the high
typicality exemplars in the Long Priming Interval case. The
intervening material, which produced the longer interval between the
category name and the exemplar, may have unintentionally biased the
sentences in the direction of the high typicality exemplar.
For the analysis using only the sentences biased in the
direction of the high typicality exemplar, both Prime Types and both
levels of Exemplar Typicality were included. The prediction that
these results would be similar to those found in Experiment 1 is not
supported by the means shown in Table 6. The Exemplar Prime,
containing both the category name and the high typicality modifier,
produced a significant 35 msec typicality effect. The previous
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analysis would suggest that this effect is due to both priming by the
category name and by the consistency or inconsistency of the Sentence
Bias and the Exemplar Prime. With the Neutral Prime, there was no
typicality effect. The effect is nonsignificant and 10 msec in the
direction opposite to that predicted.
These results are thus not completely compatible with the
results Of Experiment 1. but they are not entirely anomalous either.
The sentences in Experiment 2 were all constructed to have little
intervening material between the category name (or Neutral Prime) and
the exemplar. In this sense, they are considerably more like the
Short Priming Interval sentences from Experiment 1 than the Long
Priming Interval sentences. Table 3 shows that the typicality effect
for Neutral Prime exemplars at the Short Priming Interval was 10
msec, which did not even approach significance in later comparisons.
Thus, the physically similar sentences appear to produce more
compatible results than do the informationally similar sentences.
The results of this second analysis suggest that the separation
of the category name and the exemplar in the Long Priming Interval
condition in Experiment 1 may account for the typicality effect in
the Neutral Prime condition. In the Long Priming Interval case,
there was both more material between the two crucial words and. in
general, a more complex intervening structure. Experiments 3 and ^
look at language processes in relation to sentence structure and may
be useful in deciding if it is necessary to look to other factors
involving sentence processing to account for the inconsistencies
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between Experiments 1 and 2.
It Should be remembered that Experiments 2 and , were conducted
together. The sentences from the two studies served as distractors
for one another. Experiment
, included an unusual tas. which may
have somewhat affected the reading style of the subjects. It is
possible that the subjects' reading behavior in Experiment 2 could
have been influence by strategies appropriate to the experimental
Situation, but irrelevant to Experiment 2. The important point
presently, however, is not that the results from Experiment 2 are
wrong in some sense, but that the comparison with Experiment 1.
especially for the Neutral Prime condition, must be cautious.
In summary, the results of the first two experiments suggest
that word processing times are reflected in the fixation behavior of
the eyes during normal reading. These effects produced by contextual
information altering processing difficulty appear immediately, as the
affected word is being processed. The amount of time the eye remains
fixated on a word appears to be a reflection of both interlexical
priming, as a spreading activation model predicts, and post-access
processes of sentence integration or at least some check of
compatibility of word with the representation of sentence being
constructed.
CHAPTER
EXPERIMENT 3
In the first two experiments, the sentence was. in effect,
treated as a string of words. Distance was measured and manipulated
in terms of the number of intervening words. Reading, however, is a
linguistic activity and sentences are. minimally, words in structure.
Physical distance and structural distance are not necessarily
correlated very closely and they may have their impact on different
stages of the processing system. m the third and fourth
experiments, physical distance between two critical items is held
constant while structural distance is manipulated.
Experiment 3 originated with some questions about the unit or
units of processing in reading. The pattern of fixations in normal
reading makes it clear that the representation of the sentence is
built up word by word. Almost every word in a sentence is fixated
and these fixations follow a left-to-right sequence. Identification
of the word in the center of fixation is certainly initiated during
the fixation period. This observation does not, on the other hand,
imply that processing to full meaning proceeds word-by-word. The
full meaning of the string of words composing a sentence cannot be
obtained without taking account of the syntactic structure of the
sentence, the indicator of the relations among the meanings of the
individual words in the string.
Two questions guided the research in Experiments 3 and H.
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First, does clausal structure influence the way in which associative
relationships facilitate or interfere with language processing? if
two words are in the sa.e clausal unit, will the associative
relationship between the. have the same i.pact as when the sa.e two
words are elements of different clauses? Second, does clausal
structure control processing in some important way? Of particular
interest here is whether retrieval of referents that may help
immediate sentence comprehension is determined by syntactic structure
or operates independently of syntactic cues.
There are several ways that clausal structure and meaning,
particularly the meaning implicit in an associative relationship,
might be related to one another. If associative priming is actually
the result of lexical interconnections (Forster. 1979), these
connections might have their effect prior to the entry of the word
into the syntactic representation of the sentence. The influence of
syntax on associative priming in this case might be expected to be
small and independent of clause membership. This interpretation is
consistent with the spreading activation model studied in Experiments
1 and 2. On the other hand, clause structure may have a considerable
impact on lexical processing. A clause boundary could act as a
processing boundary. If this were true, the sentence processing
system might cut off the search for information which is to be
organized and represented together. If associative relationships
influence processes creating a coherent representation of the clause,
then associative facilitation should be considerably more powerful
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within the clause than across a clause boundary.
The third experiment investigated the processing relationship
between structure and content. In this study, strict association
based on frequent occurrence of concepts was the associative factor.
Thus it stands in contrast with the first pair of experiments which
used a single and well-defined semantic relation, that of typicality,
to measure associative effects.
An example of one of the sentences can be seen in (6a).
(6a) The guard saluted the king, and the queen
in the carriage looked annoyed.
"King" and "queen" are primary associates embedded within the
sentence frame. To make a comparison condition, the first associate,
"king", was replaced in some sentences with another word which was
also appropriate in the sentence context, but. as in the neutral
prime condition in the earlier experiments, provided no clear hint of
the second associate. (6b) is an example of this kind of sentence.
(6b) The guard saluted the man. and the queen
in the carriage looked annoyed.
Here, the word "man" acts as a neutral prime and processing time on
"queen" can be compared under the two conditions.
A second comparison condition was added to this experiment. In
Experiment 1, a priming effect was discovered. This was interpreted
as showing facilitation provided by consistent information. The
facilitation interpretation is not logically necessary, however. It
is quite possible that the neutral prime created some confusion or
87
sense of incompleteness that slowed processing. The comparisons
available in the first pair of experiments provide no basis for
deciding between these possibilities. Consequently, in the third and
fourth experiments, a second sort of neutral prime was used which was
not as vague at "thing" or "man" or "stuff". instead, a word was
chosen Which was as explicit as the primary associate, but was not
itself a close associate. An example can be seen in (6c).
(6c) The guard saluted the ambassador, and the
queen in the carriage looked annoyed.
"Ambassador" and "queen" seem quite appropriate together in this
context, and they are probably more closely associated than are "man"
and "queen", but "ambassador" has many closer associates than
"queen"
.
The syntactic part of the structure-content relationship was
manipulated by using sentences which, when read from left to right,
had an optional clause boundary between the two members of the
associative pair. (6d) gives an example of an alternative syntactic
version of the example above.
(6d) The guard saluted the king and the queen in the
carriage, but they didn't notice.
The wording of this sentence is identical to that of (6a) to the
point that "queen" appears. The only difference, in fact, is the
presence of a comma indicating that the string ending with the word
"king" is, in (6a), a complete clause while in (6d), "king" is in the
middle of a compound NP which "queen" completes. In all cases where
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a olause boundary was necessary between the two associates. It was
-r.ed by a co^na. The sa^e comparison pri.es were used in the two
syntactic forms for a given associative pair.
Following the spreading activation model. Experiment 3 predicted
that associative relationships would have their impact on sentence
comprehension prior to thp <sfaaoV e stage of processing in which syntactic
information is used. Thus, associations were expected to facilitate
processing in both clausal conditions to approximately the same
degree. In the first two experiments, the spreading activation model
did not provide a completely adequate account of the observed reading
behavior. There was evidence that some sentence integration
processes are facilitated by associative connections. In the present
experiment, this influence is expected to be stronger when both words
are in the same clause than when they are in separate clauses.
Finally. Experiment 3 distinguishes facilitation by an associate from
inhibition from an uninformative context.
Method
Subjects. Twenty-eight members of the University of Massachusetts
community were paid to participate in the experiment. All subjects
had normal uncorrected vision. None of them had ever been in an eye
movement experiment before.
Apparatus. The apparatus used in this study was the same as that
described in Chapter 2.
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Z-oedure, The procedure used was essentially Identical to that
described for Experiment 1.
Materials, Seven versions of each of ,2 sentences were constructed
in the following way. Pairs of strongly associated words (primary
associates according to at least one set of standard norms) were
obtained from Shapiro and Palermo's (1968) summary list. These
associates and their rated strength can be found in Appendix C.
Forty-two sentence frames were written to house each of the
associative pairs, preserving the original order of association. The
wording of the sentence permitted the two associates either to be in
the same clause or in separate clauses. The ending of the sentence
in the two syntactic versions differed by necessity. Because the
critical information in the experiment was processing time on the
second member of the associative pair and differences in parafoveal
information could potentially affect processing time, the information
immediately following the target associate was controlled. A
prepositional phrase (PP) dominated by the same NP as that dominating
the NP containing the target noun was common to the two syntactic
versions of the sentence. For example, in sentence frame (2),
"queen" always appears in the NP "the queen in the carriage."
As in the first pair of experiments, a neutral prime was chosen
which fit into the sentence frame, but was not semantically related
to the second associate. These neutral primes were chosen for the
specific sentence frame from the list: thing, stuff, guy, fellow, and
man. A second comparison prime, which will be referred to as a Non-
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Associative prime to distinguish it from the Neutral prime, was also
Chosen. This second prime was selected to fit the sentence frame and
to have no strong associative relationship with the second member of
the associative pair. In these respects, the Non-Associative Prime
was the same as the Neutral Prime. These primes, however, were also
selected to be on the same level of concreteness or specificity as
the original associative primes. These criteria are not well
defined, but words were selected which made the sentences sound as
natural as they did when they contained the Associative Prime. Table
7 gives examples of these six versions of a sentence formed by
factorial combination of two levels of Syntax (Boundary vs Same
Clause) and three levels of Priming (Associative. Non-Associative,
and Neutral).
An example of an additional control condition is also shown in
Table 7. The control was an attempt to estimate the basic processing
time for the target word, independent of prior processing load.
Thus, a sentence was constructed which opened with the simple NP (the
target noun) containing the target. No priming word preceded it.
Unfortunately, the first few fixations in reading tend to be
unusually long (Rayner. 1977). so merely showing this control
sentence could misrepresent the time needed to process the target by
confounding processing time with startup effects. To avoid this, a
neutral sentence containing the target was written, this being
essentially the same as the stimulus sentences with the associates in
separate clauses, but lacking the initial constituent containing the
TABLE 7
An Example of Different Forms of
a Stimulus Sentence from Experiment 3
CLAUSE BOUNDARY BETWEEN ASSOCTATFc; (BOUNDARY CONDITION)
ASSOCIATIVE PRIME;
NON-ASSOCIATIVE PRIME:
NEUTRAL PRIME:
CONTROL;
Although the pilot was unable to
brake, the plane on the icy
runway rolled to a stop.
Although the captain was unable to
brake, the plane on the icy
runway rolled to a stop.
Although the fellow was unable to
brake, the plane on the icy
runway rolled to a stop.
Everyone watched nervously out of
the window. The plane on the icy
runway rolled to a stop.
BOTH ASSOCIATES IN THE SAME CLAUSF (SAME CLAUSE CONDITION)
ASSOCIATIVE PRIME:
NON-ASSOCIATIVE PRIME;
Although the pilot was unable to
brake the plane on the icy
runway, it rolled to a stop.
Although the captain was unable to
brake the plane on the icy
runway, it rolled to a stop.
NEUTRAL PRIME: Although the fellow was unable to
brake the plane on the icy
runway, it rolled to a stop.
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prime.
seven lists of
.2 sentences were constructed. Each list
contained six sentences in each of the seven versions of a given
stimulus sentence. Each sentence fra^e appeared only once in a given
list and each version appeared once across the seven lists.
Otherwise, the assignment of sentences to lists was randon,. The
stimuli used in Experiments 3 and ^ can be found in Appendix D.
Results
The mean processing times for the factorial combination of the
two levels of syntax and the three types of prime were submitted to
an analysis of variance using subjects as the random factor. The
isolated target control was not included in this analysis.
Overall, processing was 2 msec slower for the boundary condition
than for the Same Clause sentences. The difference was not
significant (F < 1.0. S.E.D. = 5.967). The targets preceded by the
Associative Prime were processed 23 msec faster than the same targets
preceded by the Non-Associative Prime and 28 msec faster than these
targets following the Neutral Prime. This overall priming effect was
significant (F[2,5i|]
= 5.677; p = .006; S.E.D. = 8.875). There was
also a significant interaction of the syntactic condition with the
type of prime ( F[2.5^] = 3.97; p = .02^), Table 8 shows the mean
processing times for target nouns in each of the six conditions
analyzed in the analysis of variance as well as for the isolated
control condition. These means indicate that there is more impact of
93
boundary than there is when the two words are separated by a clause
boundary.
In order to evaluate these results more closely, differences
among individual means were analyzed. Because no strong predictions
were made about the relationship between the actual values of the
processing times in the two syntactic conditions, the means from each
syntactic condition were analyzed separately. The three means in the
Boundary condition showed no significant difference between any pair
of processing times. However, the 18 msec difference between the
Associative Prime condition and the Non-Associative Prime condition
did approach significance (t = 1.716; df = 27; p < .10). For the
means in the Same Clause condition, targets in the the Associative
Prime condition were processed significantly faster than in either
the Non-Associative Prime condition (t = 2.625; df r 27; p < .02) or
the Neutral Prime condition (t = 4.578; df = 27; p < .001). The
difference between the Non-Associative and Neutral Primes did not
quite achieve statistical significance (t = 1.953; df = 27; p < .10).
The Isolated Control condition produced a mean processing time
of 2^2 msec. The Isolated Control was a measure of processing time
for the target noun without the extra load of the earlier part of the
sentence. This mean was compared to each of the other means using a
t-test with the standard error estimated using the interaction MS
error. The score was significantly different from the Associative
Prime condition in the Same Clause sentences (t r 2.22; df = 27; p <
TABLE 8
Mean Fixation Durations on Target Exempl
for Stimuli in Experiment 3
(Times Are Shown in Milliseconds)
ar
BOUNDARY
SAME CLAUSE
ASSOCIATIVE
pilot .plane
237
pilot plane
219
TYPE OF PRIME
NON-ASSOCIATIVE
captain, plane
255
captain plane
2^6
NEUTRAL
fellow, plane
245
fellow plane
267
CONTROL
.The plane
242
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.05) and from the Neutral Prime condition in the sa^e sentences (t =
2.36«: df
= 27: p < .05). No other comparisons even approached
significance.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 are generally consistent with the
claim that the means in the Same Clause condition do in fact differ
from one another while those in the Boundary condition do not differ.
The Associative prime facilitates processing when both words appear
in the same clause, and it has a considerably reduced impact when the
associates are separated by a clause boundary. The Non-Associative
prime seems to be the appropriate comparison condition for assessing
the direction of processing effects. Targets following the Non-
Associative Prime are processed with approximately the same speed as
the three means in the Boundary condition and as the Isolated
Control.
The results of Experiment 3 suggest that some associative
effects proceed independently of syntactic processing, as the
spreading activation model would predict. However, associative
effects are apparently under the control of a later level of
processing, where the organization of words into meaningful units
takes place. Experiment 3 is generally consistent with the first two
experiments, in which fixation times also reflected both automatic
lexical facilitation as well as influence of integration processes.
There are two slightly controversial results in Experiment 3.
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The Neutral pri.e in the Sa.e Clause condition is significantly
Slower than the Isolated Control, tut only marginally slower than the
Non-Associative Pri.e in the sa.e Syntax condition. Although the
statistics are tentative, it see.s reasonable to assume that the 21
.sec difference between the Neutral Prime and the Non-Associative
prime conditions is indicative of a real slowdown effect.
The second controversial case is whether or not the Associative
Prime should to be interpreted as facilitative in the Boundary
condition. While targets following the Associative Prime are not
even marginally different from the Isolated Control, the difference
between processing time for targets in the Non-Associative Prime and
the Associative Prime conditions, not statistically different, are
similar in magnitude to significant effects in other experiments
reported in this paper (difference = 18 msec). In addition, the
significant overall priming effect was clearly due to the Associative
Prime case with sizeable contributions from both boundary conditions.
Consequently, it is probably prudent to accept the possibility that
there is some real effect of association even in the Boundary
condition. although this effect is considerably dampened in
comparison with the Same Clause condition.
CHAPTER
EXPERIMENT ^1
The third experiment suggested that, within a sentence, the
avaUablllty of Information which may facilitate word processing is
not invariant across syntactic structures. The idea that word
association is an automatic activity which takes place entirely on
the lexical level is not supported by these data. Interlexical
priming should not be inhibited by syntactic factors, which
presumably affect a later stage of processing. Since word processing
was affected by structure, it appears that facultative processes
occur, at least in part, at the level that meaning structures are
being constructed.
Word processing times in Experiment 3 seem to reflect both
interlexical priming and later integration processes. The marginal
association effect for the Associative Prime case in the Boundary
condition showed that associative effects are not completely
eliminated by a clause boundary. These results are interesting for
two reasons. First, they demonstrate the ways that associative
relations may influence sentence processing. Second, they suggest
that clausal structure may affect use of simple semantic relations
during ongoing sentence processing.
Contextual information can take a variety of forms of which
direct association is only one. The occurrence of direct associates
within the same sentence is probably not very frequent, so the direct
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relevance of this testing situation to normal processing is probably
minimal (Gough. Alford. and Holley-Wilcox. 1981). At the level of
automatic activation, the physical location of the associate is
probably irrelevant, but automatic activation dissipates quickly
(Neely. 1977). For some concept to continue to have an impact on
processing, it must be maintained, either in the form of conscious
rehearsal or as processes which extract and monitor thematic
information from text (Foss. 1982). Other information requires a
search through memory, a process called reinstatement (Lesgold. Roth.
& Curtis. 1979).
Experiment 4 was an investigation of the reinstatement process
and its relationship to associative priming. There are two
particular concerns in this experiment. First, does a word retrieved
from memory have the same associative priming effect that it has when
it is physically present? The idea that contextual information
automatically facilitates processing seems to assume that such a
process is common (e.g.. Seidenberg, Tanenhaus. Leiman. and
Bienkowski. 1982). The second question in Experiment ^ concerns the
degree to which syntactic structure influences the reinstatement
process. The idea that syntactic units are processing units
(recently. Townsend & Bever. 1982) suggests that all kinds of
information may not be used by the processing system at the same
time. Some Information, even semantic information, may be available
to affect early levels of processing (e.g., explicit direct
associates), while other information may not be accessed by the
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processing syste. until a unit of representation, perhaps a syntactic
constituent, has been completely processed. This later case may hold
for reinstated information. Thus, the fourth experiment investigated
differential effects of explicit and reinstated semantic associates
in relation to the same syntactic conditions studied in Experiment 3.
Experiment 4 is a study of some of the same ideas about
automatic effects of context and their impact on processing as were
investigated in the previous parts of this report. These ideas were
elaborated to include study of facilitation of processing by a
reinstated associate. The spreading activation view, which has been
the general model of automatic priming throughout this paper, might
suggest that episodic associations should facilitate processing in
the same way as a semantic associate. McKoon and Ratcliff (1979)
reported that episodic associates produced priming to the same extent
as semantic associates. A new priming technique was developed for
Experiment i|. based on the technique used by McKoon and Ratcliff.
The sentences from Experiment 3 were used, but subjects first learned
an associative connection between the first member of the associative
pair, "king" in the example above, and a semantically neutral
definite description of the word. For instance, the "king" was
described as "the tall handsome man". Readers, then, could encounter
a sentence like (2e).
(6e) The guard saluted the tall handsome man. and
the queen in the carriage looked annoyed.
Having previously learned that the king was the "tall handsome man".
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the reinstatement of this Knowledge should
.a.e the associative
relationship between "king" and ",ueen" available to influence
processing, if reinstatement takes place as soon as the phrase "tall
handsome man" is encountered, then priming should occur immediately
upon recognition of the definite description. On the other hand, if
the processing system delays until it has reached a clause boundary
to initiate reinstatement processing, then the associative connection
between "king" and "queen" should be more likely to arise after the
clause boundary has been encountered. The third possibility is that
this reinstatement activity is much like the original associative
activity and the facilitation of the second associate should respect
syntax in the same way as does the explicit association.
Method
'"^'"^e^s of the University of Massachusetts community
were paid to participate in the study. Only two had ever
participated in an eye movement study before. All had normal
uncorrected vision.
Apparatus. The eye tracking system has been described in detail in
Chapter 2.
Materials. The sentences were the same as those described in
Experiment 3, except that an additional 8 sentences were written
according to the same guidelines. This made a total of 50 stimulus
sentences.
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For each sentence, a definite description (DD) was created.
This DD was able to sensibly replace the first
.e.ber of the
associative pair. The DD was an NP consisting of the Neutral Pri.e
word (thing, stuff,
.an. fellow, or guy) plus so.e
.edifying
information which made the string distinct and distinguishable fro.
other such strings. On the other hand, the DD contained no words
Which would be likely to associatively pri.e the target word. An
example of an Associative Pri.e sentence in both Syntax conditions
and both Memory conditions can be seen in Table 9. In this example,
the word "king" fro. the original sentence has been replaced by the
DD "tall handso.e
.an." The other possible pri.es. in this case,
"ambassador" and "man." can also be replaced by the same string.
There were ten possible versions of each sentence in Experiment
4. The two types of syntax from Experiment 3 were retained. The
Associative and Non-Associative Pri.es were also retained. For each
of these four conditions, the pri.e could be replaced by the
appropriate DD, making eight conditions. Two other versions of the
sentence frame contained a neutral pri.es. one in each of the two
syntactic conditions. The Neutral Prime consisted of the DD without
any associative connection.
Ten lists of 50 sentences were created. Each list contained
five sentences in each of the ten experimental conditions. Each
sentence frame appeared in all of its ten versions across the ten
lists and no sentence frame appeared in a given list more than once.
Beyond this, assignment of a particular version of a sentence to a
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TABLE 9
An Example of Different Forms of
a Stimulus Sentence from Experiment H
LEARNING PHASE:
the king is
the tall handsome man
EXPERIMENTAL PHASE;
BOUNDARY CONDITION
EXPLICIT PRIME: The guard saluted the king,
and the queen in the carriage
looked annoyed.
REINSTATED PRIME: The guard saluted the tall handsome man.
and the queen in the carriage
looked annoyed.
SAME CLAUSE CONDITION
EXPLICIT PRIME: The guard saluted the king
and the queen in the carriage,
but they didn't notice.
REINSTATED PRIME: The guard saluted the tall handsome man
and the queen in the carriage,
but they didn't notice.
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particular list was random.
Each list was divided into ten sections. At the beginning of
each section, there were five DDs paired with the appropriate prime.
Table 10 is an example of the associative learning condition. As can
be seen, the row of asterisks above and below the sentence was used
to mark each sentence as one containing an episodic association to be
learned. These asterisks were never used with sentences which were
to be read naturally. After five of these associates had appeared
and been learned. seven or eight sentences were read for
comprehension. Two or three of these were distractor sentences. The
other five sentences were ones which were associated with the five
episodic associations learned earlier. The sentence always contained
either the explicit prime mentioned in the episodic association or it
contained the related DD.
Procedure. The procedure in this experiment was approximately the
same as that used in the other experiments. However, the learning
aspect necessitated the following changes. Readers were told that
the reading list was broken into segments. Each segment began with
five simple sentences, presented one at a time and marked off by
asterisks above and below the sentence. They were to read this
sentence and learn the association. To help with this, they were
told to form an image of the paired concepts. For example, if they
read: "The king is the tall handsome man" they were to form an image
of a tall handsome king. They were encouraged to reread this
sentence as many times as possible and only erase the screen when
10i|
TABLE 10
An Example of the Learning Phase
from Experiment H
the king is
the tall handsome man
next screen
the pig is
the thing in the barn
next screen
the fellow in overalls is
the fellow in overalls
next screen
the pilot is
the fellow in charge
next screen
the opera is
the event in the hall
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they felt they co.ld re.e»ber the paired concepts. After reading
five Of these simple sentences, they saw so^e sentences which would
not be marked off by asterisks. These they were to read for
comprehension. Subjects were Instructed to use the episodic
information to help make the sentences they were reading more
meaningful or coherent.
As in the previous experiments, the subjects were asked to
recite the sentence they had just read on an average of one sixth of
the presentations. The choice of sentences for repetition was
haphazard. In addition, if the sentence contained one of the DDs,
they were also required to report the concept associated with the DD.
Finally, to avoid confusion between memorization sentences and
experimental sentences, the experimenter warned the reader each time
the five associations had been studied and the reading phase was
about to begin.
Results
Experiment H was designed with only one Neutral Prime condition
(e.g., "The tall handsome man is the tall handsome man") to serve as
the Neutral comparison for both the Explicit Prime and Reinstatement
Prime conditions. This resulted in a design which was not completely
factorial, so the planned analyses were three partially overlapping
analyses of variance. The Neutral Prime was used as one of the
priming conditions (along with Associative and Non-Associative
Primes), with syntax (Boundary vs Same Clause) as the other factor,
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one
In two analyses of variance, one for Explicit Pri^e sentences al
and one for Reinstated Prl.e sentences alone. This format produced
an analysis which was essentially a replication of Experiment 3
(Explicit Prime only) and one with the same conditions as Experiment
3 but with reinstated primes. The third analysis compared Explicit
and Reinstated Primes, but did not include the Neutral Prime
condition.
The 2 X 3 analysis of variance, with Syntax and Priming as the
respective factors, for Explicit Primes alone produced an overall
difference between syntactic conditions of less than 1 msec (F <
1.0). The main effect of Priming was significant (F[2,78] = 13.913;
p = .000047; S.E.D. = 13.913 msec). The overall difference between
Associative Primes and Non-Associative Primes was 23 msec. The
difference between Non-Associative Primes and Neutral Primes was 22
msec. In both of these results, the fourth experiment replicated
findings from Experiment 3. However, the interaction of priming and
syntax was not at all in evidence (F < 1.0). Table 11 shows the
pattern of means for Experiment H. As can be seen, the effect of
priming for Explicit Primes in the Boundary condition was slightly
greater than in the Same Clause condition. This is a reversal of the
effects from Experiment 3.
In order to be certain that the results for this analysis were
not dependent on the Neutral Primes, a 2 X 2 analyses of variance
comparing syntax and priming was performed on the same data, but
without the data from the Neutral Prime condition. This analysis was
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TABLE 11
an Fixation Durations on Target Exemplar
for Stimuli in Experiment M
(Times Are Shown in Milliseconds)
EXPLICIT PRIME
ASSOCIATIVE NON-ASSOCIATIVE
BOUNDARY
kingrt.h.m.
king, queen
224
kingrt.h.m.
king queen
ambassador =t.h.m,
ambassador
,
queen
254
ambassadorrt .h.m,
ambassador queen
NEUTRAL
t.h.m.rt.h.m,
t.h.m. .queen
(278)
t .h .m . =t .h .m
,
t.h.m. queen
SAME CLAUSE 235 250 (270)
REINSTATED PRIME
BOUNDARY
kingrt.h.m.
t.h.m.
,
queen
254
kingrt.h.m.
t.h.m. queen
ambassadorrt. h.m.
t.h.m. .queen
255
ambassadorrt. h.m.
t.h.m. queen
t .h .m . rt .h .mi
t.h.m. .queen
278
t .h .m. rt .h .m.
t.h.m. queen
SAME CLAUSE 254 254 270
t.h.m. stands for: tall handsome man
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entirely consistent with the earlier one. Syntax had no effect (F <
1.0). Prying had a significant effect (F[,,39] =
,3.,,; p .00,,,.
The interaction term showed no signs of any effect ( F < 1.0).
The analysis of the Reinstatement Prime data had the same format
as that Of the first analysis. The 3 msec Syntax effect was not
significant (F < 1.0). The priming condition showed some slight
trend towards an effect (F[2,78] = 2.M6: p = .091; S.E.D. = ,0.255
msec). However, an examination of the data in Table 11 makes it
clear that the trend is entirely due to the Neutral primes. The
analysis without the Neutral Primes was not repeated because the
average fixation times for Associative and Non-Associative Prime
conditions for both levels of syntax were within 1 msec of one
another.
The final analysis of variance compared the Explicit and
Reinstatement conditions directly, using only the Associative and
Non-Associative Prime conditions. The design was a 2 X 2 X 2
factorial analysis of variance. As in the other analyses, syntax had
no main effect here ( F < l.O). Syntax participated in no
interactions either (all F»s < 1.0). The memory factor (Explicit vs
Reinstatement) showed a significant 13 msec effect (F[1,39] =
P = .039; S.E.D. = 6.422 msec) with the Explicit Primes showing a
greater effect than the Reinstatement Primes. The 12 msec overall
speedup for Associatively Primed words over Non-Associatively Primed
words was marginal (F[1,39] = 3.454; p = .067; S.E.D. = 6.258). The
earlier analyses make it clear that this effects lies only in the
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explicitly p.l„ed Ite... This fl„«„g ,3 supported by a 3lg„irioa„t
interaction of „e.ory conditions and pricing (Ft,. 39] = 5.8.9- p -
•019). The pricing effect In the Explicit condition was 23 .sJc and
m the reinstatement condition was leas than 1 msec.
Discussion
The fourth experiment answers certain questions, but opens some
new questions about the proper interpretation of Experiment 3.
First. When information is contained in episodic memory and
reinstated during reading, the reinstated information no longer has
the priming capability of the explicit associate. The complete lack
of difference among the Associative and Non-Associative Reinstated
Primes in the two syntactic conditions makes this very clear. Thi
is not merely due to the DD not being processed, as the slower times
for the Neutral primes indicate.
The Explicit Prime condition was intended to be a replication of
Experiment 3, but the results only partially reflect the results of
the earlier experiment. The priming difference is still there, but
the syntactic distinction is gone along with interesting interaction
of syntax and priming.
There is no simple explanation for these results. The tasks in
two experiments, unfortunately, were not quite the same, so
comparison is not easy. The instructions in Experiment ^1 required
the subject to search memory when the episodic string or word was
encountered. This made perfect sense when the DD was presented, but
s
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when the explicit prime was Drp«?*.nf^^ 4.u.P rne p esented, this procedure caused a memory
search which was not made in Experiment 7 k • .e 3. Subjects frequently
reported using the retrieved DD to help ma.e sense of the sentence.
It is likely that they meant that the DD was consistent with the
sentence and they integrated this new information into their meaning
representation. Another relevant factor may be that emphasis in the
instructions on retrieval of episodic information made the
reinstatement activity seem very important, distracting subjects
somewhat from simple sentence comprehension.
In summary, there seems little reason at this point to doubt the
results of either Experiment 3 or i|. The two tasks differed
sufficiently so that there is no strong expectation that the results
Should appear be identical. It is true that these differences were
noticed after the fact and that such a conclusion, however well
motivated by the data and testing situations, requires further study.
The question of which of the two studies is closer to "normal"
reading is an interesting one. In experiment 3, the entire context
for the reader was contained within the individual sentence. It may
be true that, in this impoverished environment, syntax takes on
unusual importance. On the other hand, the integration activity
demanded in the fourth experiment was very explicit. On the surface,
we might claim that it is closer to the "normal" activity of a reader
trying to integrate information among sentences. However, the normal
reader does not have the task of integrating specific elements of
meaning. Thus, integration in a very restricted and possibly unique
Ill
sense may have distracted the reader form <^ne paying normal attention to
the syntactic structure of the sentence.
CHAPTER VII
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Preexpe.l.e„t3l Interlexical relationsHlps are used the la„,.age
processing syste. during normal reading, m addition, the thesis has
been concerned with a logically prior question: Does the behavior of
the eyes during normal reading reflect s»all
.o.entary variations In
processing difficulty?
Four experiments were conducted to address these problems.
Experiment
1 measured processing times on words which were related to
another word in an earlier part of the sentence on two associative
dimensions: class inclusion and typicality. The results of this
experiment showed that priming by a category name facilitates word
processing and that the degree of this facilitation is affected by
the typicality of the exemplar. A surprising typicality effect for
words which had not been primed by a category name indicated that
variations in processing times could not be accounted for entirely by
difficulty of encoding words. Thus, some processing time includes
post-access processes involving integration of a word with the
sentence representation.
A second experiment was conducted to determine whether the
interpretation of processing time variations could be accounted for
entirely by sentence integration processes. Sentence frames
containing the target words were biased toward either the high or the
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low typicality exemplar. The consistency of this Mas with the
typicality Of the exemplar appeared to affect processing,
.ut
consistency or ease of integration could not simply replace
typicality. The results of this experiment suggested that processing
time reflects both encoding and post-access integration.
Experiment 3 controlled for physical distance between two
associated words while varying syntactic distance. Highly associated
words were either separated by a clause boundary or were contained
within the same clause. Comparison conditions were created by
replacing the first member of the associated pair by either a
neutral, uninformative word or by a more natural word which was also
not strongly associated to the target word (the second member of the
associative pair). The results of this experiment suggested that the
associative relationship facilitated processing more when both words
were within the same clause than when they were in separate clauses.
Similarly, processing was slowed by an uninformative word within the
same clause, but not in a separate clause. These results indicated
that interlexical relations do not have effects that are entirely
independent of processes involving syntactic and semantic structures
in the sentence.
Experiment ^1 was similar to Experiment 3 in the materials used,
but a new task was introduced. Readers learned episodic associations
between the prime words and descriptive phrases. In some conditions,
these descriptive phrases replaced the primes in the stimulus
sentences. The task of retrieving these associations eliminated the
1U
effect in which a syntactic boundary dampened the associative effect
or the Slowdown from an uninformative word. In addition, the results
indicated that only a physically present associate will produce
facilitation of word processing. Access to the same associate
through episodic memory does not produce facilitation.
The most consistent effect, which runs through the entire set of
experiments, is that processing of a word is facilitated by prior
processing of a strong associate contained in an earlier part of
sentence. The results of experiments 1 and 2 indicated that the
priming effect is due to both facilitation of initial word encoding
and to post-access integration processes. The third experiment
suggested that priming, as well as problems with integrating some
difficult information, may be reduced if the two associates are in
separate clauses. Experiment ^ showed that the clausal effect is not
absolute, but may be dependent on the processing style and task
demands. Finally, the fourth experiment suggested that the associate
may need to be physically present in the sentence for priming effects
to appear. Effortful retrieval of the associate from memory may not
produce facilitation.
In the first experiment, a two-stage model of word processing
was proposed as an explanation of word processing effects. According
to the model, the first stage of processing, the encoding of a word,
is facilitated by excitation of the concept of that word by prior
processing of a semantic associate. If no close associate has been
processed, as is usually the case, encoding is influenced more by
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other factor, such as the visual features of the «ord. I„ the secon.
stage, the meaning of the word being fUated Is integrated with other
concepts composing the sentence up to the fixated word. The leaning
Of the new word can he used to clarify aspects of the sentence
representation which have been insufficiently specified for the
reader, as occurs in the neutral prine conditions of all four
experiments.
The first two experiments were the source of this general model.
Experiment 3 indicated that full associative facilitation may not
extend throughout an entire sentence. When the associates were parts
Of separate clauses, the associative priming effect was diminished,
though not completely eliminated. The most likely explanation within
the present framework is that spreading excitation between associates
has some effect independent of syntactic structure, but that post-
access effects are limited to a single clausal unit.
Experiment
^ showed an associative priming effect which was
independent of syntactic structure, indicating that the syntactic
effects observed in Experiment 3 may not be a necessary feature of
sentence comprehension. It was suggested that the task demand that
readers integrate information stored in memory with the sentence
being read may have reduced the reader's reliance on syntactic
information or have exaggerated interlexical priming effects to an
extent that syntactic effects were disguised.
The fourth experiment also indicated that retrieval of
information from memory is not always facilitating, even if the same
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information could logically help predict a subsequent word. The
Reinstatement condition in Experiment
. is not unlike what is
generally thought to happen when context is used to facilitate
processing. A reader encounters a concept and later sees some
reference to that concept. A search is made of memory and the
original concept is reinstated, thereafter facilitating processing of
the sentence. Subjects reported doing all of this and even said that
the reinstated information was helpful, but there was no indication
that the retrieval influenced language processing.
The general model described here is consistent with a number of
models which have been proposed to explain various aspects of
language processing (Cairns. Cowart. & Jablon, 1982; Ehrlich &
Rayner. 1982; Forster. 1979; Just & Carpenter, 1980; Rayner. Carlson,
& Frazier, in press). What is important about the present
experiments is that they provide evidence of immediate effects on
ocular behavior during reading using relatively subtle contextual
manipulations confined to single sentences. In addition, by using
different kinds of associates and various kinds of primes, the
generality of associative priming effect has been shown and it has
been distinguished from effects of confusion leading to slower than
normal processing speed.
Finally, the results suggest that some contextual effects
indicated by variations in fixation times on words during reading may
best be sought at a relatively local level. The first task of the
language comprehender may be to organize structurally incomplete
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a
this information.
Directions for Future Research
The questions which initially motivated the research reported in
this thesis were clarified, but. as may be true of most research,
never answered. The most basic question, raised at the conception of
this project, if the behavior of the eyes reflects the process of
comprehension in any interesting way. These experiments, along with
a few but growing number of others, strongly support the claim that
the eyes are under the control of language processing mechanisms.
The fixation duration measure is sensitive to reasonably subtle
variations in language processing demands.
The form of the experiments reported here was inspired by
studies of semantic memory. There is a notable contrast between the
level of precision possible in many semantic memory studies (e.g..
Neely, 1977) and that possible based on the present data. When
subjects are reading and not merely participating in a strange
psychological test (as lexical decision or sentence verification must
seem to the uninitiated), layers of complexity are added to the
behavior which is measured. Nevertheless, some questions which are
current and important in semantic memory theory could be addressed in
these reading experiments and preliminary conclusions could be drawn.
For example, it was possible to distinguish conditions under which
processing was facilitated and others when processing was inhibited.
118
word
ons
The fact that strong associates facilitate processing for one another
is a commonplace in semantic memory circles, but it is still
interesting in understanding reading. Furthermore, the distinction
between automatic priming and strategic priming finds an interesting
parallel in the difference between facilitation of
identification and facilitation of sentence integration.
Several interesting questions about associations, questi
Which might be less well motivated in other task domains, arise from
studying reading. The failure to find even a hint of an associative
effect in the reinstatement condition of Experiment H. for example,
is a surprising result. Certainly, the lack of this expected effect
could be due to an artifact of the experiment. However, the
expectation that priming would occur in this situation is
theoretically motivated. Priming presumably arises from the
activation of one concept by another. Activation is assumed to be
the same as accessing the concept, regardless of the direction of
access. Thinking a word and seeing or hearing a word should produce
the same results. The reinstatement results suggests, intriguingly
,
that they are not.
Another interesting finding is the contrasting effects of syntax
in Experiments 3 and ^1. In Experiment 3, the syntactic boundary had
a strong effect on processing, while in Experiment ^, the boundary
was completely ineffective. The difference between the two
experimental situations is interesting in this case. In Experiment
3t the task was to read for comprehension and nothing else. In
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Experiment tHe reader wa. as.ed to Integrate new l„ror„atlo„ with
facts
.torea i„
.e^ory. I„ the task of reading for comprehension
alone, a strong syntactic effect was found. When readers were
encouraged to Integrate Information, syntactic effects disappeared or
were disguised. Research In on-line processing frequently shows the
same contrast, some experiments Indicating the syntactic Information
is heavily relied upon, other experiments suggesting that language
processors may have a choice of what to attend to. This research
suggests that the task may Influence the choice of Information which
guides language processing.
Two experiments reported by Just and Carpenter (1978) are
consistent with the idea that experimental subjects may process
language in ways which respond to task demands. In this experiment
(which was discussed earlier) readers made significantly shorter
fixations on a target word when a context sentence was very
consistent than when an inference was required to establish
consistency. For example, the word KILLER was fixated for less time
following mention of a person who WAS KILLED than of a person who
DIED. However, this effect was significant only when the subjects
task was to decide if the first sentence was consistent with the
second. When the subject had merely to read the sentences, the
effect was reduced in size and was no longer significant. From these
results, it is reasonable to suggest that contextual information,
even context which is highly related (e.g., killers and murders), may
not always be used by the language processor. The contrast between
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Ju3t and Carpenter.3 two experiments Is not unli.e that between the
two experiments reported here. When readers concentrate on
integration and evaluation (Just and Carpenter
-s first experiment and
Experiment
, here), syntactic information exerts less control on the
processing system. When readers are attending to meaning, but making
no special attempt to connect concepts (Just and Carpenter's second
experiment and Experiment 3 here), then syntactic information has a
much more direct Influence on processing.
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^^T^GORY EXEMPLAR TYPIC FREQ
1. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE RUM
^ . UU 3
RYE 3.52 4
2. ANIMAL LION 1 .87 1 7
BULL 3. Oil 14
3. BEVERAGE SODA 1 .S7 oJ
MALT ^.35 1
BIRD SPARROW 1 .83 nyj
VULTURE 4.17 4
5. BODY PART (HUMAN) LEGS 1 .35 58
SKIN 4.30 47
6. BUILDING (PART) CEILING 1.61 31
CORNERS 4.30 18
7. BUILDING (RELIGIOUS) CHAPEL 1.86 20
MOSQUE 3.27 10
8. CHEMICAL ELEMENT CARBON 1.50 30
SILVER 4.24 29
9. CLERGYMAN PRIEST 1.09 16
RECTOR 4.82 33
10. CLOTH COTTON 1.48 38
CANVAS 3.87 19
11. CLOTHING PANTS 1.09 9
SCARF 4.26 4
1 o ROBBERY 1 .26 10
TREASON 3.13 6
13. DISEASE MALARIA 1.87 3
MEASLES 4.17 2
U. DISTANCE (UNIT) YARDS 1.65 64
STEPS 5.30 119
15. DWELLING CABIN 2.52 23
MOTEL 4.61 24
16. ELECTIVE OFFICE
17. FISH
18. FLOWER
19. FOOD SEASONING
20. FOOTGEAR
21. FRUIT
22. FUEL
23. FURNITURE
2^. GEOLOGICAL FORMATION
25. INSECT
26. JEWEL
27 . METAL
28. MUSIC (TYPE)
29. PROFESSION
30. READING MATERIAL
31. SCIENCE
PRESTDFNT
1
.
Dm 382
SECRETARY 4. 96 191
HADDOCK 1
1 1
LOBSTER 5. 74 1
DAISIES 1
1
"50J? 3
ORCHIDS 3. 74 3
SALT 1
1
ll A
WINE 5. 04 72
BOOTS 1
1
PUMPS 3. 90 5
APPLE 1
1 •
no oy
PRUNE 3. 91 1
GASOLINE 1
1 •
nil
CHARCOAL 3. 87 14
COUCH 1
1 •
1 0
CLOCK 5. 65 20
CANYON 2. OQ 1?
HARBOR 4. 32 37
WASP 2. 22 2
WORM i|. 65 4
DIAMOND 1 00
CRYSTAL 78 23
COPPER 2. 00 13
COBALT 4. 39 2
CLASSICAL 1 87
SPIRITUAL 3. 78 64
LAWYER 1. 09 43
ARTIST 3. 30 57
NOVEL 1. 48 59
BIBLE 4. 43 14
CHEMISTRY 1. 30 16
NUTRITION 4. 04 8
32. SHIP Utol ROYER 2.00 2
SUBMARINE
^.39 27
33. SNAKE CUbnA 1.35 3
ADDER 4. OH 0
3^. SPORT nULKLY 1.57 1
HIKING i|.70 2
35. TOOL (CARPENTER'S) M AMMCDniinrlt,n 1 .09 9
CHISEL 3.30 11
36. TOY
1 .52 no
CLAY ^1.17 100
37. TREE PTNF
1 .o3 111
PALM 3.52 22
38. VEGETABLE CARROTS 1.22 n
PEANUTS 5.78 5
39. VEHICLE TRUCK 1.M8 57
WAGON 11.61 55
WEAPON PISTOL 1.35 27
POISON 11.65 10
MEAN RATINGS HIGH TYPIC.
LOW TYPIC.
1.54
4.28
30.58
28.00
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"%ur7th?'d.l-l%''' <ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES. THAT STUFF>
,
but Lthe detectives saw that] the <RUM RYF> in k vli
was almost gone. * ^" bottle
2. They could not see the <ANIMAL. THINO [anywhere in the
ti:m aS.' --^^ enoJgh to"scar:
^*
?hrHJ'>f 'L^''^"^* "^^^i^^ the <BEVERAGE, THINO[ e had bought] was a <SODA. MALT> until he drank it.
4. The housekeeper remarked that the <BIRD. THINO [which passedby the window] was a <SPARROW, VULTURE> which was building a
5. The stupid nurse looked at each <PART OF HIS BODY, AND EVERYTHING> [with a very serious expression] except for his <LEGS,bKIN>
,
which was the reason he had come to the clinic.
6. Because of the inspector's training, the first <PART OF A
BUILDING, THING ON HIS LIST> he checked [upon his arrival] was
the <CEILING, CORNERS> in several rooms to see if the work was
done well.
7. John did not know that they were constructing <A RELIGIOUS
BUILDING, SOME THING> [at the end of the street] until the
<CHAPEL, MOSQUE> was nearly completed.
8. The professor was amused that the strange <CHEMICAL ELEMENT,
NEW STUFF> [which was confusing everyone] was just <CARBON,
SILVER> from a test tube they had forgotten to clean.
9. He noted with some embarrassment that the approaching
<CLERGYMAN, PERSON> [in the heavy overcoat] was the <PRIEST,
RECTOR> whose car he had hit the day before.
10. The salesman said that the <CLOTH, STUFF> [which they thought
was so pretty] was actually <COTTON, CANVAS> which had been
dyed.
11. When he returned home, he discovered that all of his <CLOTHING,
THINGS> [that had been in the closet] , even his <PANTS, SCARF>
, had been stolen.
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STFP?f ^
THINGS> was [believed by historians to be] <YARDSEPS> when plots of land were being divided.
15. The
c
16.
18.
surprised people found that the <DWELLING. THINO [thevould see in the distance] was a <CABIN. MOTEL> near the shore.'
?MPMs"r''^\uP^^^ ^^^^ "^^ <ELECTED TO OFFICE. GIVENMib 1URN> [in the local men's club] as <PRESIDENT, SECRETARY>despite all his hard work. i:-^nciHni^,
17. He claimed that he loved this kind of <FISH, FOOD>. but [it was
obvious to everyone that] he thought the <HADDOCK, LOBSTER>
tasted pretty bad.
She really appreciated the <FLOWERS, PRESENT> [when he gave
them(it) to her] because the <DAISIES, ORCHIDS> meant that he
cared about her feelings.
19. My date insisted that her portion had been ruined because the
<FOOD SEASONING. ONLY THINO [they had put] on it was <SALT.
WINE> which had been added too liberally.
20. His sister searched through the box of <FOOTGEAR, THINGS> [in
the basement] for the <BOOTS, PUMPS> she wore in messy weather.
21. The bowl was full of <FRUIT. THINGS>
,
[which had been
beautifully arranged,] and some <APPLES, PRUNES> were on the
bottom.
22. The fireman reported that the burning <FUEL, STUFF> [in the
trashcan in the garage] was <GASOLINE. CHARCOAL> which was
giving off toxic fumes.
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23. The two women thought that the last of the <FURNITURE THTMr9%
uZri:: ''''''''' <couch:'''Sck>* nil
JoRMAnON^'oF
'suc'h Tl,Csf\.''' ""T ^"^^^^^"^ <GEOLOGICAL
<CANYON HARBORf K '^"'^^^ ^'"^^ine studying] was aL , BOR>
,
because it could take so many forms.
could''be'found'ln''tl'''' '}\ ''"'^ ^"INGS> [that
they'sea.ed him.
'"''^ '''''' ^°«"^>
'
^™
^^'^ claimed that this <JEWEL. THINO [in the brownbox] had to be a <DIAMOND. CRYSTAL> which had been poorly cut
?TM?R^^^ T "°^r ^" ^'P^''^ ^" «ith this <METAL.S UFF>
,
he found [to his relief] that the <COFPER. COBALT>
could be manipulated when it was heated.
28. The store sold almost every type of <MUSIC, THINO [he could
possibly imagine]
, including some <CLASSICAL, SPIRITUAL>
recordings which were very rare.
29. His father had decided on his <PROFESSION, FUTURE>
, [without
so much as a comment to him,] and a(n) <LAWYER, ARTIST> was
what he was expected to become.
30. He looked on the shelf for <READING MATERIAL, SOME THINO [to
keep himself amused]
, but a <NOVEL, BIBLE > was all he found.
31. He told all his friends that he hated <SCIENCE, STUDYINO
[because it required so much work]
, but his <CHEMISTRY,
NUTRITION> class was worth the extra effort.
32. Looking through the telescope, my brother shouted that the
<SHIP, SPOT> [we could just make out] was a <DESTROYER,
SUBMARINE> going out to sea.
33. They first heard the sound of the <SNAKE, THINO [, though they
had been very careful,] when the <COBRA, ADDER> attacked them.
3^. The student admitted that he liked many <SPORTS, THINGS> [which
were a distraction from his work] , and <HOCKEY, HIKING> was by
far his favorite activity.
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35. I
37.
38,
40,
wer^"sUt!:r'in'':he'2an7?'' '''''''' ^"^^^^> ^^^^^^oxuuing tne nail] for a <HAMMFR rHT<?Fi s
assistant. ^n nntH, CHISEL> to give my
?r!t t'^V!l\ THINGS> [behind the chair] with the
away.
<BALL. CLAY> which the children h^d forgotten to put
?ll?Mrf ^''^w
gentleman wanted to remove the beautiful old <TREETHINO [and clear the area] to put a <PINE. PALM> in its place
IhP H
'^'^ experimenting with <VEGETABLES. THINGS>
. so
Te /ancy FrTncrso'p!''" ''''''''' -
mPPrV/^"''" ^^^"^ stranded tourist that the only <VEHICLE.
m.!h / setting him home] was a <TRUCK. WAGON> which wasused for carrying hay.
fl!^ !!!^!
determined to stop him with the only <WEAPON, THING>
she had [m the house]
,
the <PISTOL. POISON> she had hidden inher purse.
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CRITICAL WORDS FROM EXPERIMENT 2
CATEGORY
1. ROARING ANIMAL
LnAnUlNlJ THING
2. SINGING BIRD
THING
3. LITTLE RELIGIOUS
A R A n
BUILDING
4. LIGHT SUMMER CLOTH
ncii V I 1 1 N 1 STUFF
5. DRESSY CLOTHING
WARM THING
6. THIEF'S CRIME
SPY'S CRIME
7. FATAL DISEASE
CHILDREN'S PROBLEM
8. MOUNTAIN DWELLING
TOURIST
9. FRIED
CANNED
10. SPRING
CORSAGE
1 1 . COMMON
GOURMET
12. JUICY
DRIED
13. HEAVY
DELICATE
1^. SWARMING
SQUIRMING
PLACE
FISH
STUFF
FLOWERS
PLANTS
SEASONING
STUFF
FRUIT
FOOD
FURNITURE
THINGS
INSECTS
THINGS
EXEMPLAR
LION
BULL
SPARROW
VULTURE
CHAPEL
MOSQUE
COTTON
CANVAS
SKIRT
SCARF
ROBBERY
TREASON
MALARIA
MEASLES
CABIN
MOTEL
HADDOCK
SARDINES
DAISIES
ORCHIDS
SALT
WINE
APPLES
PRUNES
COUCH
CLOCK
WASPS
WORMS
15. SPARKLING
FAKE
JEWEL
OBJECT
DIAMOND
CRYSTAL
16. INTERESTING
RELIGIOUS
READING MATFRTAT
THING
NOVEL
BIBLE
17. EXPERIMENTAL
HEALTH
SCIFNTF
CLASS
CHEMISTRY
NUTRITION
18. HEAVILY-ARMED
HALF-SUBMERGED
on j.r
THING
DESTROYER
SUBMARINE
19. WINTER
MOUNTAIN
SPORT
ACTIVITY
nULKL
I
HIKING
20. FRAGRANT
TROPICAL
TREE
PLANT
riNh
PALM
21. CRUNCHY
SALTED
VEGETABLES
FOOD
PAD DATOLAnnUTS
PEANUTS
22
LITTLE RED
VEHICLE
THING
TRUCK
WAGON
23. POINTED
MAKESHIFT
WEAPON
THING
KNIFE
STICK
24. FORCEFUL
YOUNG
OFFICER
MAN
MAJOR
CADET
STIMULUS SENTENCES FROM EXPERIMENT 2
1. The <ROARING, CHARGING> <ANIMAL, THING> could possibly be the
<LION, BULL> which had escaped from the zoo.
2. The <SINGING, CIRCLING> <BIRD, THING> appeared to be the
<SPARROW, VULTURE> which we had noticed earlier.
3. The <LITTLE, ARAB> <RELIGIOUS BUILDING, BUILDING> was famous as
the <CHAPEL, MOSQUE> which had been used as a refuge during the
war.
4. The <LIGHT SUMMER, HEAVY TENT> <CLOTH, STUFF> was really the
<COTTON, CANVAS> which had been imported from France.
U1
5. The only <DRESSY, WARM> <CLOTHING THTNP^
<SKIRT. SCARF> which her
.other ha/gi ven h^^^^^^
6. The <THIEF'S. SPys> worse <CRIME MISTAFCF> w»c
<ROBBERY. TREASON> which he had coJuL y^ars be^Te?^'"'
7. The <FATAL, CHILDREN'S> <DISEASE PRORI FM^ woe ^ • .
<MAUBIA. „EASLES> that had rec/„Vl/h\™ oned^l n^'t^^e^'a^er
9. The <FRIED, CANNED> <FJ^u <!Tiijrrs i.
.<HADDOCK. siRDINES^l\icl"fha/rX'edrrt ^ lunch.^^
^DAISIES, ORCHIDS> which we had seen in the display.
<sIit'°wtT>:
<SEASONING. STUFF> the chef used was theSALT, WINE> which he had mixed with some spices.
12. The <JUICY. DRIED> sliced <FRUIT. FOOD> was probably the
<APPLES. PRUNES> that my wife bought at the farm.
13. The last of the <HEAVY, DELICATE> <FURNITURE. THINGS> to be
moved was the <COUCH, CLOCK> which was in the livingroom.
U. The <SWARMING, SQUIRMING> <INSECTS, THINGS> were just the
<WASPS, WORMS> which he had caught in the woods.
15. This <SPARKLING, FAKE> <JEWEL, OBJECT> must be the <DIAMOND,
CRYSTAL> which was donated to the museum by the wealthy
heiress.
16. The only <INTERESTING. RELIGIOUS> <READING MATERIAL, THING>
around was the <NOVEL, BIBLE> which was in the top drawer of
the desk.
17. The only required <EXPERIMENTAL, HEALTH> <SCIENCE, CLASS> here
is the <CHEMISTRY, NUTRITION> which the medical students hate
to take.
1«2
18. The <HEAV1LY-ARMED, HALF-SUBMERGED) <SH1P THINO „
19. His favorite <WlNTEIi. MOUNTAIN) <SPORT ACTIVITY)
ITT,T'' ""^-^ -"""to "III
<?ME 'mSf^hV ""ly be the^t'lNE, PALM> that IS unique to this valley.
<'cIrR0TS PEANSx'sf"h-
<VEGETABLES. F00D> included the
^tAKROT , UTS> w ich I had brought to the party.
<TRUCK, WAGON> which the child had gotten for Christmas.
SwiFr'sfl^^^ T';!''J' apparently the<KNI E. STICK> which he had secretly taken from the prison
211. The <FORCEFUL. YOUNO <OFFICER. MAN> turned out to be the
<MAJOR, CADET> who was training some people on the base.
APPENDIX D
CRITICAL WORDS AND SENTENCE STIMULI FROM EXPERIMENTS 3 AND H
^^3
CRITICAL WORDS FROM EXPERIMENTS 3 AND H
c;ttm„t mc
primary ASSOCIATIVE
STIMULUS ASSOCIATE FREQUENCY
1. ATTORNEY LAW
.56
2. AUTHOR BOOK
.66
3. BREAD BUTTER
.62
^. BROTHER SISTER
-56
5. BRUSH COMB
.31
6. CAT DOG
.60
7. COOK FOOD .il0
8. COW MILK
.53
9. CUP SAUCER
.69
10. DECOY DUCK
.^19
11. DENTIST TOOTH
.41
12. DETECTIVE POLICE
.13
13. DOCK BOAT
.48
14. DOCTOR
15. DOOR WINDOW .40
16. ENEMY FRIEND
.32
17. FATHER MOTHER .44
18. HAMMER NAIL .54
19. HAT COAT .28
20. HUMP CAMEL
.38
21. JEWELER DIAMOND
.35
22. JURY JUDGE
.13
23. KING QUEEN
.66
2H. LEAVES TREE
.66
25. LION TIGER
.22
26. MECHANIC CAR
.36
27. MILLIONAIRE MONEY
.49
28. MONK PRIEST
.38
29. MUG BEER
.60
30. PIANO MUSIC
.42
31. PILOT PLANE
.62
32. PISTOL BULLET
.22
33. PLUMBER PIPE
.24
34. POOR RICH
.65
35. RIDER HORSE
.30
36. SALT PEPPER
.48
37. SHOE FOOT
.33
38. SOLDIER ARMY
.31
39. SPOOL THREAD
.91
40. TABLE CHAIR
.69
41. TEACHERS SCHOOL
.15
42. WEB SPIDER
.79
U6
EXPERIMENT l\ ONLY
^3. BALLET DANCER
.62
ill. CLOUDS SKY
.30
45. CRADLE BABY
.79
U6. COFFEE TEA
.21
47. CORK BOTTLE
.58
48. DESERT SAND
.20
49. IGLOO ESKIMO
.37
50. LETTUCE TOMATO
.25
STIMULUS SENTENCES FROM EXPERIMENTS 3 AND 4
Although the <ATTORNEYS, EXECUTIVES, PEOPLE/PEOPLE FROM THE
COMPANY> seemed to understand, <the LAWS> on chemical dumping
were read to them to emphasize our position.
Although the <ATTORNEYS, EXECUTIVES, PEOPLE/PEOPLE FROM THE
COMPANY> seemed to understand <the LAWS> on chemical dumping,
we read them to emphasize our position.
We asked everyone in the auditorium to be silent. <The LAWS> on
chemical dumping were read to the audience to emphasize our
position.
Although the <AUTHOR, ECONOMIST, GUY/GUY FROM THE INSTITUTE>
had wanted to finish, <the BOOK> about the economic crisis was
rushed into publication in rough form.
speaking engagements L? an of h\s u^^^^ ^^^"^'"^^
^U^^^^r;e^- -^^^^^^^ an. <.e
BUTTER>'from'Jh''' Tf'' ^^"^^/^ASTELESS WHITE STUFF> and <thef the refrigerator, but I was still hungry.
Lss'stale".'"'*
refrigerator make it seem
DRFSSFn^rrir'nus^'^^'l'^
his(the) <BROTHER. MANAGER. FELLOW/WELL-
Joudly? ' ^" ""'^^"^^ applauded
The singer introduced his(the) <BROTHER. MANAGER. FELLOW/WELL-
DRESSED FELLOW> and <his SISTER> in the audience, and they were
warmly applauded.
The singer finished his performance. <His SISTER> in the
audience applauded loudly.
I picked up the <BRUSH. TOOTHBRUSH, THING/GREEN PLASTIC THING>,
and <the COMB> on the sink fell into the toilet.
I picked up the <BRUSH, TOOTHBRUSH. THING/GREEN PLASTIC THING>
and <the COMB> on the sink, then I put them into my bag.
I turned around quickly. <The COMB> on the sink was knocked
into the toilet.
I called the <CAT. PONY. THING/FRISKY LITTLE THING>. and <the
POGS> from across the street came running into the yard.
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ah^ Fo'cVrr-thr/"' f"'""' ™^ had washed,^ine HJ0D> fo the banquet was brought to him.
Ttll FmD>'fr;.h"'K'"' ™ ™^ "ad washed< ne OOD or the banquet, he began to prepare it.
iio:z ti^L'io^:! '''' ''''' ^-^-^
When the <COW, PIG, THING/THING IN THE BARN> kicked. <the MILK>in the bucket spilled all over the farmer.
When the <COW. PIG. THING/THING IN THE BARN> kicked <the MILK>in the bucket, it spilled all over the farmer.
The man tripped. <The MILK> in the bucket spilled all over the
farmer.
When the <CUP, JAR, THING/SLIPPERY FRAGILE THING> hit, <the
SAUCER> in the sink was broken.
When the <CUP, JAR, THING/SLIPPERY FRAGILE THING> hit <the
SAUCER> in the sink, both of them broke.
My hand was slippery. <The SAUCER> in the sink broke when I
dropped the plate on it.
He shot the <DECOY, SIGN, OBJECT/CARVED PAINTED OBJECT>, and
<the DUCK> in the pond escaped without a scratch.
He shot the <DECOY, SIGN, OBJECT/CARVED PAINTED OBJECT> and
<the DUCK> in the pond, but the water was too murky to recover
either.
^^9
I was pleased, <The DlJrjf> <n fv,^sin uuLK in the pond escaped the hunter.
riTMTrs ° ""^ TtCHNICIAN, FELLOW/FELI
However gently the <DENTIST. TECHNICIAN, FELLOW/FELLOW AT THE
?Un"c> rf35.;''l/.^^'Lll?I.- E . FELLOW AT THE
ke
O
t ]
oIvIt/'felTllk! u"'"'k'" '"^ T*™> With the<-avi y leit li e it was being jabbed.
iFUml^""
<DETECTIVE, CORONER, FELLOW/SUSPICIOUS RUDEFELLOW>. and <the POLICE> from headquarters arrived with him.
^FIT^'ou^^'^ H^^^.u
CORONER, FELLOW/SUSPICIOUS RUDEFELLOW> and <the POLICE> from headquarters, but they seemed
uninterested in what I had found.
I made an urgent phone call. <The POLICE> from headquarters
arrived quickly. ^
When the <DOCK, TRAILER, OBJECT/ROTTING WOODEN OBJECT>
overturned, <the BOATS> of the club members were damaged.
When the <DOCK, TRAILER, OBJECT/ROTTING WOODEN OBJECT>
overturned <the BOATS> of the club members, the careless
manager was fired.
The manager had been negligent. <The BOATS> of the club
members were damaged in the storm.
I called for the <DOCTOR, SURGEON, MAN/DISTINGUISHED OLD MAN>,
and <the NURSE> behind the desk came running into the room.
I called for the <DOCTOR, SURGEON, MAN/DISTINGUISHED OLD MAN>
and <the NURSE> behind the desk, and they came running into the
room.
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The buzzer made a loud noise. <The NURSF> h«hHn^ 4.v, ^ ,
running into the room. ^^^^""^ ^^^'^ ^^me
I!om1^°^^^'^
'"'''''^^ ^^''^^ <The WINDOWS> in the newhouse were already broken.
The politician denounced several <ENEMTES thvr^nixi
PEOPLE/IMPORTANT PEOPLE>. and <his FRIENDS> at the convenUo;!seemed uncomfortable with the tone of his speech.
The politician denounced several <ENEMIES ADVT<;nR9
PEOPLE/IMPORTANT PEOPLE> and <his FRIENDS> at the coJvIJuon'
saying that his campaign had been unfairly criticized.
The politician gave a long speech. <His FRIENDS> at the
convention seemed a bit uncomfortable.
The student saw her(the) <FATHER, FRIEND, MAN/WORRIED NERVOUS
MAN>, and <her MOTHER> in the car watched them embrace.
The student saw her(the) <FATHER, FRIEND, MAN/WORRIED NERVOUS
MAN> and <her MOTHER> in the car, and ran over to greet them.
The student was with her friend. <Her MOTHER> in the car
watched them embrace.
Because the <HAMMER, PLIERS, THING/THING FROM THE SHED> had
broken, <the NAILS> in the plank were impossible to remove.
Because the <HAMMER, PLIERS, THING/THING FROM THE SHED> had
broken the NAILS> in the plank, walking barefoot was dangerous.
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We tried everything we could think of. <The NAILS> in fhoplank were impossible to remove. ^"
mAT.^""^."^ .^^^ THING/NEW ACQUISITION>. and <theCOAT> on the hook fell onto the floor.
cSlT>Tth?H''i; '."v.''^' T"^NG/NEW ACQUISITION> and <theCOAT> on the hook, then she turned to speak with us.
I opened the door. <The COAT> on the hook fell onto the floor.
20. Although the <HUMP. SADDLE. THING/COARSE BROWN THING> made ithard to stay on. <the CAMEL> with the nasty disposition was notlun to ride.
Although the <HUMP. SADDLE. THING/COARSE BROWN THING> made ithard to stay on <the CAMEL> with the nasty disposition, riding
It was not fun.
I did not enjoying myself very much at the circus. <The CAMEL>
with the nasty disposition bit me.
.
Because the <JEWELER. PRODUCER. MAN/MAN WITH THE GLASSES>
remembered. <the DIAMOND> of the actress was delivered to her
room.
Because the <JEWELER. PRODUCER. MAN/MAN WITH THE GLASSES>
remembered <the DIAMOND> of the actress, it was delivered to
her room.
It was time for her to leave. <The DIAMOND> of the actress was
delivered to her room.
22. Mr. Jones addressed the <JURY, CROWD. PEOPLE/CLOSELY ATTENTIVE
PEOPLE>, and <the JUDGE> in the murder trial listened intently.
Mr. Jones addressed the <JURY, CROWD. PEOPLE/CLOSELY ATTENTIVE
PEOPLE> and <the JUDGE> in the murder trial, while everyone
listened intently.
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InnoyeT' '"'^ looked
<^he ™ES>'?n't'K f «KRFUL STUFF> bl.w off.^zn TREES> m the backyard seemed very bare.
^h^ TRP^P.w^'^^i' stuff/bright cheerful STUFF> blew off<the EES> m the backyard, the area seemed very bleak.
Winter had arrived. <The TREES> in the backyard looked very
Although the <LION, DOG, THING/THING IN THE CAGE> attacked,
<the TIGER> on the steel chain was able to defend itself.
Although the <LION, DOG, THING/THING IN THE CAGE> attacked <the
TIGER> on the steel chain, the trainer was able to stop the
fight.
We were glad the fence was high. <The TIGER> on the steel
chain seemed huge.
Sometime after the <MECHANIC, WATCHMAN, FELLOW/FELLOW IN
OVERALLS> left, <the CARS> in the parking lot were vandalized.
Sometime after the <MECHANIC, WATCHMAN, FELLOW/FELLOW IN
OVERALLS> left <the CARS> in the parking lot, they were
vandalized.
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Everyone was very angry and upset. <The tar^^lot had been vandalized. ^" parking
After the <MILLIONAIRE, CLERK, FELLOW/FELLOW WITH THF rm...had finished counting. <the MONFy^ iJs ^
returned to the safe " ^'"^^^ envelopes was
f^ELLOW/FELLOW WITH THE CIGAR>had finished counting <the MONEY> in the green envelonp.was returned to the safe. pes, it
We were satisfied that all care had been taken. <The MONEY> inthe green envelopes was returned to the safe.
I knew the <MONK, SPEAKER,
PRIEST> at the convention look
I knew the <MONK, SPEAKER,
PRIEST> at the convention, but
I waved my hand. <The PRIEST>
MAN/BROWN-ROBED MAN>, and <the
d familiar too.
MAN/BROWN-ROBED MAN> and <the
they didn't recognize me.
in the room recognized me.
Vfhen the <MUG, CAN, THING/ICY METAL THING> leaked, <the BEER>
on the floor had to be cleaned up.
When the <MUG, CAN. THING/ICY METAL THING> leaked <the BEER> on
the floor, we had to clean up the mess.
The party was over. <The BEER> on the floor had to be cleaned
up.
As his(the) <PIANO, TAPERECORDER, OBJECT/HIS TREASURED OBJECT>
revealed, <the MUSIO of the young composer had power and
depth.
As his(the) <PIANO, TAPERECORDER, OBJECT/HIS TREASURED OBJECT>
revealed <the MUSIO of the young composer, we were astounded
by the music's power and depth.
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ZT/lJtX'- yo-E composer had such
stop. °" '^''^ rolled to a
"abrtot^.:"<'t°I^LX'on^r'-r"''-°'' "'"-^^^
stop. runway, it rolled to a
runway rolled to a stop. '
II;H^5r"n„T?.lo^^^^^°^' OBJECT/DANGEROUS METAL OBJECT>.
?^ kk"-^'^^'
"""'"^y ^^^^ the same as those usedm the robbery.
They found the <PISTOL. KNIFE, OBJECT/DANGEROUS METAL OBJECT>
^
..^
BULLETS> in the box nearby were the same as those usedin the robbery.
It was just as we had suspected. <The BULLETS> in the box were
the same as those used in the robbery.
Although the <PLUMBER, REPAIRMAN, MAN/MAN WITH THE RUBBER
BOOTS> had left, <the PIPES> in the basement were still
leaking.
Although the <PLUMBER, REPAIRMAN, MAN/MAN WITH THE RUBBER
BOOTS> had left <the PIPES> in the basement, the kitchen was
still cluttered.
We were not very happy about the repairs. <The PIPES> in the
basement were still leaking.
The new tax hurt the <POOR, WORKERS, PEOPLE/SHOCKED LOCAL
PEOPLE>, and <the RICH> from the city benefited.
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It was the same old story. <The rtph^ f^^m
from the tax. ^'^^^^ ^''^ ^^^^ benefited
luppii^s'gTL::""' ''''' "°«^^> ^^^^
<theTEPPER>' /n'^'il'
stuff/stuff IN THE CANISTER>. and
stew.
^" "^^^^y containers was knocked into the
!!!v, ^"ornl STUFF/STUFF IN THE CANISTER> and<the PEPFER> m the nearby container, and they fell into the
stew.
I was not paying attention. <The PEPPER> in the open
containers fell into the stew.
Although the <SHOE, BANDAGE, THING/STIFF NEW THING> hurt, <the
FOOT> with the blisters was protected by it.
Although the <SHOE, BANDAGE, THING/STIFF NEW THING> hurt <the
FOOT> with the blisters, John thought it was wise to keep it
on.
He was not worried. <The FOOT> with the blisters was protected
by a bandage.
Because the OOLDIERS, GUARDS, PEOPLE/PEOPLE AT THE STATION>
refused to leave, <the ARMY> of the dictator executed them.
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Because the <SOLDIERS. GUARDS. PEOPLE/PEOPLE AT THE ^tattows
eL'c^tt the.!^^^^
''''' ^ictatf..The^™>
Ix:cu;'ed rTelfr''^"^
'''^
^^^tator
^SrEaTL t!;: hT?'' THING/ROUND THING>. and <the1HREAD> m he basket was just the right color.
Tn fH""K ^tV^^^^^^
P^TCH. THING/ROUND THING> and <the THREAD>i the basket, so he was able to repair the rip quickly.
Ijas^ surprised. <The THREAD> in the basket was just the right
I removed the <TABLE, TRUNK. THING/HEAVY ANTIQUE THING> and
<the CHAIRS> from the attic finally fit into the room
^ut^r^"^ THING/HEAVY ANTIQUE THING> and <theCHAIRS> from the attic, so the place seemed less cluttered.
I was very pleased. <The CHAIRS> from the attic fit into the
room easily.
We liked the <TEACHERS. STAFF. PEOPLE/FRIENDLY PEOPLE>. and
<the SCHOOL> in the little town seemed progressive, but we
enrolled our children elsewhere.
We liked the <TEACHERS, STAFF, PEOPLE/FRIENDLY PEOPLE> and <the
SCHOOL> in the little town, but we decided to enroll our
children elsewhere.
It was not an easy decision. <The SCHOOL> in the little town
seemed progressive, but we enrolled our children elsewhere.
Because the <WEB, LACE, THING/DELICATELY WOVEN THING> shook,
<the SPIDER> with the funny legs left for a safer place.
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STIMULI FROM EXPERIMENT 4 ONLY.
43. Because the <BALLET. OPERA, EVENT/EVENT IN THE HALL> wasentertaining, <the DANCER> from the Soviet Union stayed unUlthe end.
Because the <BALLET. OPERA. EVENT/EVENT IN THE HALL>
entertaining <the DANCER> from the Soviet Union, we let hstay for the entire performance.
was
im
iLl^t ECLIPSE. THING/FRIGHTENING THING> darkened. <thei>Ky> to the west looked very ominous.
As the <CLOUD. ECLIPSE, THING/FRIGHTENING THING> darkened <the
SKY> to the west, the native became very quiet.
45. When the <CRADLE, BED, THING/LIGHT BLUE THING> shook, <the
BABy> under the blanket began to cry.
When the <CRADLE, BED, THING /LIGHT BLUE THING> shook <the BABY>
under the blanket, the infant began to cry.
46. I bought the <COFFEE, HERBS, STUFF/AROMATIC STUFF>, and <the
TEA> at the specialty store also looked very interesting.
I bought the <COFFEE, HERBS, STUFF/AROMATIC STUFF> and <the
TEA> at the specialty store, but they weren't any better than
the supermarket brands.
47. We got the <CORK, PLUG, THING/STERILIZED THING>, and <the
BOTTLE> for the new batch of wine was ready to be sealed.
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^Lflf .^^^
<DESERT. PRAIRIE. PLACE/HOT GLOOMY PLACE> and <theSAND> m his shoes, but he did not complain.
uTMht ESkZ> '"'T* SNOW> had warmed
fristbUten™ ^^^^ to his
Sr%re%s™.' '"'tl''' P^ACE/PLACE in the SN0W> had warmed
tell u h J ?
°" expedition, the traveler was able to
50. Terry ate the <LETTUCE. MAYONNAISE, STUFF/STUFF FROM THE BOWL>
and <the TOMATO> in the salad got tossed away.
Terry ate the <LETTUCE. MAYONNAISE, STUFF/STUFF FROM THE BOWL>
and <the TOMATO> in the salad, then complained that he had none
for his sandwich.
APPENDIX E
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY TABLES
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EXPERIMENT 1
160
Delay
Priming
Delay x
Typicality
Priming x
Typicality
3-Way
n DF
F
64 1/15 1281.4453 1611.9286
.7950 .6096
64 1/15 25509.7578 4411.7078 5.7823 .0281
64 1/15 14813.5078 1265.7911 11.7030 .0040
32 1/15 1762.6953 2281.6120
.7726 .6028
32 1/15 855.9453 4773.5286
.1793 .6798
32 1/15 250.3203 872.7703
.2868 .6056
16 1/15 1898.8203 3538.3703 .5366 .5187
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EXPERIMENT 1
SHORT DELAY
VARIABLE
Priming
Typicality
LONG DELAY
VARIABLE
Priming
Typicality
11 ur MS MSerror F
1 / 1
C
1 / 1
D
20341 .891 1690.6573 12.0319
.0037
32 1/15 4273.8906 3198.2573 1.3363 .2651
16 1/15 385.1406 2388.3740
.1613
.6943
_n DF MS MSerror F
32 1/15 6930.5625 5002.6625 1.3854 .2566
32 1/15 11395.5625 2841.0625 4.0110 .0610
16 1/15 1764.0000 2022.7667
.8721 .6319
EXPERIMENT 2
PRIMED ITEMS ONLY
VARIABLE n DF MS MSerror
Context 32 I/15 5148.0625 1916.0958
Bias
Exemplar 32 I/15 4761.0000 2966.1000
Typicality
Bias X 16 1/15 182.2500 1757.8167
Typicality
HIGH TYPICALITY CONTEXT ONLY
VARIABLE n DF MS MSerror
Exemplar 32 I/30 2462,6406 1955.4698
Typicality
Priming 32 I/30 356.2656 3599.6406
Priming x 16 I/30 8303.7656 1955.4698
Typicality
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EXPERIMENT 3
VARIABLE
Syntax
Priming
Syntax x
Priming
n DF MS MSerror F P
1/27 172.02i«0 1'<95.3325
.1150
.7338
56 2/5^ 12518.0060 2205. 1973 5.6766 .0060
28 2/5M 6166.3631 1553.0606 3.9705 .02^40
EXPERIMENT 4
VARIABLF n TM?UP MS MSerror F
Memory 160 1/39 U566.5031 3299.7531 4.4144
.0398
Syntax 160 1/39 219.4531 2336.7672
.0939 .7548
Priming 160 1/39 10822.8781 3133.1281 3.4543
.0673
Memory x
Syntax
80 1/39 283.1281 2479.4935
.1142
.73^*1
Memory x
Priming
80 1/39 9735.0781 1664.3281 5.8493 .0193
Syntax x
Priming
80 1/39 1440.7531 3284.1185
.^387 .5185
3-Way 40 1/39 1004.6531 3610.6083
.2783 .6070


